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STUDENT ARTICLES
SHIELDING PARTIES TO TITLE VII ACTIONS FOR
SEXUAL HARASSMENT FROM THE DISCOVERY
OF THEIR SEXUAL HISTORY-SHOULD
RULE 412 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE BE APPLICABLE TO DISCOVERY?
RICHARD C. BELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 1997, just days after the Supreme Court had
ruled unanimously in a highly-publicized case that Paula Jones
could proceed with her sexual harassment suit against President
Clinton,1 a dispute arose on national television between Ms.
Jones' lawyers and Robert Bennett, President Clinton's lawyer.
On a popular news program, after Ms. Jones' lawyers indicated
that they would seek testimony from other women whom the
President may have propositioned in the past, Bennett was asked
whether that sort of discovery was proper. He responded:
They raise that now for purposes of trying to humiliate and
force and create all sorts of political furor. You know, it's a
two-way street... We've thoroughly investigated the case.
If Paula Jones insists on having her day in court and her
trial, and she really wants to put her reputation at issue as
we hear, we are prepared to do it. 2
In fact, later reports confirmed that the President's lawyers had
interviewed a man who alleged to have been sexually involved
with Jones in the past.'
* B.A., 1993, Gordon College; J.D. Candidate, 1998, Notre Dame Law
School; ThomasJ. White Scholar, 1996-1998. The author dedicates this Note to
his wife, Diane Bell. The author thanks Professor John Robinson for his
invaluable assistance throughout the writing of this Note, and Professor Patrick
J. Schiltz for his helpful comments.
1. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
2. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, June 1, 1997).
3. See Neil A. Lewis, President's Accuser May Be Questioned On Her Sexual
Past, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1997, at Al.
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Bennett's apparent threat to sully Ms. Jones' reputation by
probing into her sexual past drew harsh criticism from women's
groups that have traditionally supported the President,4 and
prompted Bennett to claim that his prior comments had been
misunderstood.5 "[Ms. Jones'] sex life is of no particular con-
cern to me," Bennett explained, while nonetheless vowing to
challenge Ms. Jones' reputation for truthfulness without delving
into her sexual history.6
Whether or not Bennett intended to explore Ms. Jones' sex-
ual past, the popular understanding that this was indeed what he
intended by his comments brought to the nation's consciousness
a problem that has long been a part of sexual harassment litiga-
tion. In fact, it is quite common that during the discovery pro-
cess, parties to sexual harassment suits attempt to elicit from
their opponents information regarding their prior sexual behav-
ior or sexual predisposition. There are various reasons why a
party might find such information useful. For example, a plain-
tiff may wish to elicit information regarding her harasser's prior
sexual conduct at work to establish that he created a sexually hos-
tile environment.' Likewise, an employer may wish to discover a
plaintiffs sexual conduct at work to establish that although the
alleged harasser created a sexually hostile environment, the
4. For example, Patricia Ireland, president of the National Organization
of Women, stated, "It is very disappointing to see him falling back on the so-
called 'nuts or sluts strategy' that has long been used to discredit women who
speak out." Brian McGrory, Tactics on Jones Seen Backfiring for Clinton, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 4, 1997, at Al.
5. See David Stout, Clinton Lawyer Retreats on Threat Over Accuser's Sexual
Past, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1997, at A17.
6. Id.
7. See Lawrence J. Baer et al., Discovering Sexual Relations - Balancing the
Fundamental Right to Privacy Against the Need for Discovery in a Sexual Harassment
Case, 25 NEW ENG. L. REv. 849 (1991); LindaJ. Krieger & Cindi Fox, Evidentiary
Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1985); Ellen
E. Schultz &Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs' Sex Lives are Being Laid Bare
in Harassment Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al. For purposes of this
Note, "sexual behavior" and "predisposition" will be given the meanings
anticipated by the Advisory Committee's note to Federal Rule of Evidence 412.
According to the Advisory Committee, "[p]ast sexual behavior connotes all
activities that involve actual physical conduct . . . In addition, the word
'behavior' should be construed to include activities of the mind, such as
fantasies or dreams." FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. The
Advisory Committee further intends "sexual predisposition" to mean "evidence
that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the
proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder." Id.
8. See Krieger & Fox, supra note 7, at 132-36; Baer et al., supra note 7, at
851; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 849 (1991).
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plaintiff "welcomed" his conduct.' Disclosure of such intimate
information, however, has a tendency to embarrass litigants, and
to discourage potential plaintiffs from bringing sexual harass-
ment suits.' ° Disclosure of sexual history similarly prompts many
sexual harassment plaintiffs to settle a claim for a fraction of its
value. 1 Thus, apart from the legitimate reasons why a party may
wish to discover information concerning her opponent's sexual
past or predisposition, a party may desire such information
merely for its value in pressuring the other party to dismiss a suit
or to settle it for a sum unequal to its actual settlement value.
12
Consequently, in sexual harassment discovery disputes, courts
often address conflicting interests - protecting a party's privacy,
preventing abuse of the discovery process, and permitting parties
to discover information that is sufficient to argue their cases
under existing legal theories."i
In 1994, Congress amended the federal rape shield rule14 to
apply to "any civil . . .proceeding involving alleged sexual mis-
9. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), established the
requirement that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1994), show that her
employer's conduct was "unwelcome." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. To determine
whether Mechelle Vinson, the plaintiff in Meritor, "welcomed" her supervisor's
conduct under a test that examined the "totality of circumstances" and "the
record as a whole," the Supreme Court stated that evidence of her sexually
provocative speech or dress was "obviously relevant." Id. at 69 (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
Use of such evidence to establish that a plaintiff welcomed her harasser's
harassment has been criticized, and indeed the "unwelcome" standard itself has
been criticized. See Estrich, supra note 8, at 826-34; Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did
She Ask for It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1558 passim (1992). Arguably, the 1994 amendments to Rule
412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which extend the federal "rape shield"
rule to civil cases, has rendered inadmissible much of the evidence previously
admissible under this standard. See Paul Nicholas Monnin, Note, Proving
Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment
Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REv.
1155 (1995); Jacqueline H. Sloan, Comment, Extending Rape Shield Protection to
Sexual Harassment Actions: New Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Undermines Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 363 (1996).
10. See Krieger & Fox, supra note 7, at 117; see also Priest v. Rotary, 98
F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("Discovery of intimate aspects of plaintiffs'
lives ... has the clear potential to discourage sexual harassment litigants from
prosecuting lawsuits[,] ... to annoy and [to] harass them significantly.").
11. See Schultz & Woo, supra note 7.
12. See Krieger & Fox, supra note 7, at 117.
13. See Baer et al., supra note 7.
14. See FED. R. EVlD. 412. All subsequent references in this Note to "Rule
412" will refer to rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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conduct."15 Rule 412, a rule of admissibility, renders inadmissi-
ble evidence of any alleged victim's prior sexual behavior or
sexual predisposition' 6 unless the evidence is otherwise admissi-
ble under the rules of evidence, and unless its probative value
"substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party."' 7 As a rule of admissibility, it does
not govern discovery.'" However, within the scope of discovery, a
party can obtain information that "appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."19 Further, the
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 412 instructs that courts
should presumptively issue protective orders precluding the dis-
covery of an alleged victim's sexual predisposition or behavior,
" [i]n order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412. "12o It is
therefore clear that Rule 412 has a role to play in sexual harass-
ment discovery disputes. What is unclear is the scope of the role
that Rule 412 should play.
Liberal application of Rule 412 to the discovery context will
remedy some of the concerns facing sexual harassment litigants.
The privacy of many individuals will be better protected. Fur-
thermore, fewer potential plaintiffs will be reluctant to bring sex-
ual harassment claims and fewer will feel compelled to settle
their claims for token amounts. However, construing Rule 412
broadly in these disputes could prove to be both underinclusive
and overinclusive.
Applying Rule 412 broadly to discovery could be underinclu-
sive in two respects. First, while the privacy interests of alleged
victims of sexual misconduct could be protected, because by its
terms Rule 412 applies only to alleged victims of sexual miscon-
duct, the privacy interests of their alleged harassers would
remain open to public intrusion. 21 For example, any additional
protection that Rule 412 could provide Paula Jones during dis-
covery would not prevent the details of any prior sexual proposi-
15. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1919 (1994).
16. See supra note 7 for a definition of "sexual behavior" and "sexual
predisposition."
17. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
18. See FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note (stating that the
procedures contained in subdivision (c) of the rule, "do not apply to discovery
of a victim's past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases, which will be
continued to be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.").
19. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
20. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
21. By its terms, Rule 412 applies only to alleged victims of sexual
misconduct, and not to alleged perpetrators of sexual misconduct. See FED. R.
EVD. 412(a)(1), (a)(2).
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tions that President Clinton may have made from finding their
way to the tabloids. Is the privacy of the alleged victim worthy of
greater protection than the privacy of the alleged victimizer? In
other words, does the value of one's interest in privacy depend
upon whether one is making or receiving an allegation of sexual
harassment? Second, while the Advisory Committee's note to
Rule 412 instructs judges to issue protective orders presump-
tively, this assumes that parties will seek protective orders.
Improperly counseled parties who fail to seek protective orders
may find their personal lives open to public scrutiny.
A broad application of Rule 412 to the discovery context
could likewise prove to be overinclusive. While prohibiting a
company from asking a sexual harassment plaintiff questions of
an intimate sexual nature may protect her privacy interests, it
may also prevent the company from defending the claim ade-
quately. Take, for example, a sexual harassment plaintiff who
asserts that alleged workplace harassment has rendered her
unable to experience sexual intimacy and, thus, the company
should pay her a large sum of money to compensate her injury.
If a judge prevents the company from asking her detailed ques-
tions about this alleged injury because in the judge's mind the
probative value of such information would not substantially out-
weigh the harm that such questions may cause the plaintiff, the
judge would essentially, "turn the rape 'shield' law into a sword
solely for plaintiff's benefit."22 Such a result would seem to be
contrary to the basic demands of civil justice.
This Note will examine discovery disputes in sexual harass-
ment cases concerning evidence of an alleged victim's sexual
behavior or predisposition. Part II of this Note will examine how
these disputes are to be resolved under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and how the amendments to Rule 412 may have
altered this scheme. Part III will determine the effect that the
amended Rule 412 has had on the outcome of these disputes by
examining case law prior to and subsequent to the 1994 amend-
ments to Rule 412, and will conclude that courts today typically
apply Rule 412 to these discovery disputes. Part IV will examine
the competing policy considerations behind applying Rule 412 to
discovery disputes involving an individual's sexual history. This
note will conclude in Part IV that although reform is necessary,
due to the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of Rule 412
applied broadly to the discovery process, Rule 412 inadequately
balances the competing interests. This note will therefore pro-
22. Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL 117886, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995).
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pose an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
will better balance the competing interests.
II. How THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RESOLVE
DISCOVERY DisPuTEs CONCERNING SEXUAL EVIDENCE
A. The Legal Standard-Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Discovery disputes in sexual harassment suits brought in fed-
eral court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196423 are
governed by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 24
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1994). The federal cause of action for
sexual harassment is brought pursuant to the language in Title VII that makes it
unlawful for an employer, "to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
such individual's ... sex." Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1). This Note will focus on suits
brought under Title VII, although particular cases discussed in this Note may
also involve state law tort or statutory claims.
24. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26. All subsequent references in this Note to "Rule
26" will refer to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The portions
to Rule 26 relevant to this Note read:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of
the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The information
sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence...
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought.., and for good cause shown ... the court
... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that
the . . .discovery not be had; (2) that the . . .discovery may be had
only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the
time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4)
that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the ...
discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that the discovery be
conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court; (6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by
order of the court; ... (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened
as directed by the court.
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Under Rule 26, information is subject to discovery if it is
unprivileged and, "relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action. ' 25 The concept of "relevance" under Rule 26 is
broader in scope than the concept of admissibility. 26 Informa-
tion that is sought in discovery does not need to be admissible,
but only, "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence. 27  Accordingly, "[i] nadmissible hearsay evi-
dence[,] . . . evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible at
trial because of its unduly prejudicial effect[,] ... [and] [e]ven
[evidence that is contrary to] a strong public policy," is discovera-
ble. 28 According to one court, "'a request for discovery should
be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information
sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action."' 29 The
scope of Rule 26(b) (1) is purposefully broad to advance impor-
tant policy considerations such as, "providing both parties with
'information essential to the proper litigation of all relevant
facts, . . . eliminat[ing] surprise, and . . . promot[ing] settle-
ment."'0 Thus, in a Title VII discovery dispute, evidence of a
party's sexual behavior meets the criteria of Rule 26(b)(1) so
long as it is not subject to a recognized privilege31 and it is calcu-
lated to lead to admissible evidence.
Even if a discovery request meets the rather broad standard
established in Rule 26(b) (1), judges are nonetheless granted dis-
cretion under Rule 26(c) to limit the request by issuing a "pro-
FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
26. SeeJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 1993)
("At present, relevance is interpreted very broadly." (citations omitted)); 6
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.41[1] (3d ed. 1997)
("The scope of relevance during discovery is much broader than the standard
of admissibility at trial." (footnote omitted)); Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142
F.R.D. 311, 315 (S.D. Iowa 1992) ("The test of relevance in the discovery
context is a very broad one." (citing AM Int'l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 100
F.R.D. 255, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1981)).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
28. 6 MooRE, supra note 26, § 26.42 (footnotes omitted).
29. Weiss, 142 F.R.D. at 315 (quoting AM Int'l, Inc., 100 F.R.D. at 257
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
30. Id. at 313 (quoting In re Hawaii Corp., 88 F.R.D. 518, 524 (D. Haw.
1980)); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 26, § 7.1 (stating that discovery's
purposes are to preserve relevant information, to ascertain the disputed issues,
and to lead parties to admissible evidence concerning the disputed issues).
31. A privilege that could be particularly important for Title VII plaintiffs
in discovery disputes is the "psychologist-patient" or "psychiatrist-patient"
privilege. See Covell v. CNG Transmission Corp., 863 F. Supp. 202, 205 (M.D.
Pa. 1994) (finding such a privilege in a Title VII discovery dispute); Ziemann v.
Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 155 F.R.D. 497, 506 (D.N.J. 1994) (same).
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tective order. '3 2 Anyone from whom discovery is sought can seek
from a district court a protective order under Rule 26(c) that
limits the discovery request by precluding questions regarding
certain matters, by limiting the mode of discovery or the circum-
stances under which discovery can be attained, or by precluding
discovery entirely.3" Under Rule 26(c), the person who seeks to
limit the scope of discovery bears the burden to establish "good
cause" that a protective order is necessary, "to protect ... [the]
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense."34 Courts often require a person seeking a
protective order to meet that burden by demonstrating, "a partic-
ular need for protection," rather than by making, "[b] road alle-
gations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or
articulated reasoning."3 5 Moreover, courts generally determine
whether one has met her burden of establishing "good cause" for
a protective order by balancing her opponent's need for the
information against the discovery's potential to annoy, embarrass
or oppress her.36 Hence, even though policy considerations that
32. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26; see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 26, § 7.15
("Federal Rule 26(c) ... provides the courts with broad discretion to protect a
party or other person from 'annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense."' (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c))); see also Farnsworth v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) ("The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery whenever possible. The
trial court, however, is given wide discretion in setting the limits of discovery."
(citations omitted)); Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D. Iowa
1992) ("A district court is afforded wide discretion . . .in limiting discovery
where there is a showing of good cause." (citations omitted)); Priest v. Rotary,
98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("Even if the information defendant seeks
did fall within Rule 26(b), the Court must still consider the propriety of a
protective order under 26(c)."); Williams v. District Court, 866 P.2d 908, 912-13
(Colo. 1993) (vacating a trial court's discovery order under Colorado's version
of Rule 26, because in denying a motion for a protective order, the trial court
merely found the information requested in discovery to be "relevant" under
Colorado's Rule 26(b) (1), and failed to consider Rule 26(c)).
33. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F.
Supp. 216, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("IT]he burden of persuasion is on the party
seeking the protective order . . . ."); Weiss, 142 F.R.D. at 314 ("The party or
person seeking a protective order bears the burden of making the 'good cause'
showing ....").
35. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986);
see also Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing
Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121); Bridges, 850 F. Supp. at 223 (citing Cipollone, 785
F.2d at 1121).
36. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994)
("In considering whether good cause exists.., the federal courts have generally
adopted a balancing process . . .balanc[ing] the requesting party's need for
information against the injury that might result." (citations omitted));
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underlie Rule 26 favor broad discovery, the rule recognizes that
a countervailing policy of protecting an individual who is subject
to harassing discovery requests can outweigh the policy consider-
ations that favor broad discovery. s
Under this scheme, a party from whom information con-
cerning her past sexual conduct or predisposition is sought in
discovery can avoid disclosing the information by one of two
arguments. She can argue that the information her opponent
seeks fails to meet the standard of Rule 26(b) by being unlikely,
"to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."39 Given the
broad scope of Rule 26(b), this can be a difficult argument to
win. In the alternative, she can establish under Rule 26(c) that
her opponent has little need for the information, while the infor-
mation has a substantial tendency to annoy, embarrass or
oppress her.4" While this remains the basic scheme for discovery,
the 1994 amendments to Rule 412 may have altered this scheme
in the context of discovery disputes involving the sexual history
or predisposition of an alleged victim of sexual misconduct.
B. Rule 412 and its Applicability to Discovery
On October 28, 1978, President Carter signed into law the
Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978,4 ' stating that,
"[t]oo often rape trials have been as humiliating as the sexual
assault itself.' ' 42 Prior to this law, which became Rule 412, evi-
dence of a woman's promiscuity was admissible in a rape trial to
challenge her credibility43 and to argue that she consented to the
alleged rape.44 Perhaps Representative Holtzman, who spon-
Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547 ("While Rule 26(c) articulates a single standard for
ruling on a protective order motion, that of 'good cause,' the federal courts
have superimposed a somewhat more demanding balancing of interests
approach to the rule." (citations omitted)); Frank, 924 F. Supp. at 623 (quoting
Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787).
37. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
38. See Friedenthal et al., supra note 26, § 7.15.
39. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(1).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
41. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540,
92 Stat. 2046 (1978).
42. Statement of President Carter upon signing the Privacy Protection for
Rape Victims Act of 1978 into law, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1902 (Oct. 30,
1978).
43. See 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRiALs AT COMMON LAW § 924a
(3d. ed 1940).
44. See 1 id. § 62 (finding character evidence of an alleged rape victim's
promiscuity to be generally admissible to prove consent); id. § 200 (arguing
that evidence of particular acts of promiscuity should be admissible to prove
consent in a rape trial). Indeed, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules
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sored the Act, best stated the impetus behind the original enact-
ment of Rule 412:
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated
and harassed when they report and prosecute the rape.
Bullied and cross-examined about their prior sexual exper-
iences, many find the trial almost as degrading as the rape
itself. Since rape trials become inquisitions into the vic-
tim's morality, not trials of the defendant's innocence or
guilt, it is not surprising that it is the least reported crime.
It is estimated that as few as one in ten rapes is ever
reported.4 5
It is apparent from this excerpt that Congress advanced two
important policies in enacting Rule 412. First, Congress
intended to protect the privacy of rape victims.4 6 Second, Con-
gress intended to encourage victims of rape to report the
crimes.4 7
As originally enacted, Rule 412 provided that, "in a criminal
case in which a person is accused of rape or assault with intent to
commit rape,48 reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual
behavior of an alleged victim . . . is not admissible," while evi-
dence of specific acts of prior sexual behavior was admissible
under certain circumstances.49 In 1994, however, Congress
of Evidence stated that under Rule 404(a)(2), which makes admissible
"[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of [a] crime offered
by an accused," such evidence may be used, "in support of a claim of . . .
consent in a case of rape .... " FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (2) advisory committee's
note.
45. 124 CONG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman), quoted
in Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
46. "[T]he principal purpose of this legislation is to protect rape victims
from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their
private lives." 124 CONG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).
47. "[B]y protecting victims from humiliation, [the Privacy Protection for
Rape Victims Act] encourage [s] the reporting of rape." Statement of President
Carter upon signing the Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978 into
law, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978).
48. Congress expanded the scope of Rule 412 in 1988 as part of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7046(a), 102 Stat. 4400 (1988).
Rather than applying to criminal rape cases or criminal assault with intent to
commit rape cases, the amended Rule 412 applied to criminal cases involving
offenses, "under chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code," or any federal
criminal case involving a sexual offense. FED. R. EvID. 412 (1988) (amended
1994).
49. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (1978), amended Iy Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7046(a), 102 Stat. 4400 (1988), amended by Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40141(b),
108 Stat. 1919 (1994). The exceptions to the original Rule 412 included
evidence that was constitutionally required to be admitted, evidence of prior
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amended Rule 412 to apply to, "any civil or criminal proceeding
involving alleged sexual misconduct."5 Thus, Rule 412 now
applies to sexual harassment actions.51 The reason for extending
Rule 412 protection to civil cases is explained in the Advisory
Committee's note, which states:
sexual behavior to prove that someone other than the defendant was "the
source of semen or injury," and evidence of prior sexual behavior with the
defendant to prove that the accused consented to the sexual conduct that was
at issue in the prosecution's case. FED. R. EVID. 412(b) (1978) (amended 1994).
Before such evidence could be admitted, the defendant was required to present
the evidence at a hearing and prove its relevance and that its probative value
outweighed its danger of unfairly prejudicing the jury. FED. R. EvID. 412(c)
(1978) (amended 1994).
50. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). The portions of the amended Rule 412 that are
relevant to this Note read:
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not
admissible in any civil . . . proceeding involving alleged sexual
misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) Exceptions ...
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy
by the alleged victim.
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b)
must:
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial
specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose
for which it is offered unless the court, for good cause,
requires a different time for filing or permits filing during
trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged
victim or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or
representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must
conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a
right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and
the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal
unless the court orders otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 412.
51. Indeed, the Advisory Committee's note states explicitly that, "Rule
412 will . .. apply in a Title VII action in which the plaintiff has alleged sexual
harassment." FED. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note.
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The need to protect alleged victims against invasions of pri-
vacy, potential embarrassment, and unwarranted sexual
stereotyping, and the wish to encourage victims to come
forward when they have been sexually molested do not dis-
appear because the context has shifted from a criminal
prosecution to a claim for damages or injunctive relief.
There is a strong social policy in not only punishing those
who engage in sexual misconduct, but in also providing
relief to the victim. Thus, Rule 412 applies in any civil case
in which a person claims to be the victim of sexual miscon-
duct, such as actions for sexual battery or sexual
harassment.5
2
Hence, by amending Rule 412 to apply to civil trials, Congress
has advanced the same policy considerations that support Rule
412 in its criminal context.
Under the current version of Rule 412, evidence that is,
"offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior... [or] to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposi-
tion," is inadmissible5 3 unless it qualifies under a specified excep-
tion.5 4 The Advisory Committee's note defines "sexual behavior"
and "sexual predisposition."5' According to the Advisory Com-
mittee, "[p] ast sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve
actual physical conduct, i.e., sexual intercourse and sexual con-
tact, or that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact."5 6 More-
over, "behavior" includes, "activities of the mind, such as
fantasies or dreams. ' 57 "Sexual predisposition" is intended to
constitute, "evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activi-
ties or thoughts but that the proponent believes may have a sex-
52. Id.
53. FED. R. EVD. 412(a) (1), (a)(2).
54. The exceptions to Rule 412 are listed in subsection (b) of the rule.
FED. R. EVID. 412(b). The exceptions for criminal trials are essentially the same
as those enumerated in the original Rule 412. FED. R. EVD. 412(b)(1).
However, the exception for evidence of prior sexual behavior to prove that
someone other than the defendant was "the source of semen or injury" was
expanded to include proof that another was the source of "other physical
evidence." FED. R. EVD. 412(b) (1) (a). The exception for evidence of other
sexual behavior or predisposition in civil trials is discussed infra, at notes 60-66
and accompanying text.
55. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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ual connotation for the factfinder."58 Hence, the scope of Rule
412 is quite broad.59
Although sexual behavior or sexual predisposition evidence
is generally inadmissible under Rule 412 against an alleged vic-
tim of sexual misconduct,6 ° it may nevertheless be admitted in a
civil trial if it qualifies as an exception under Rule 412(b) (2).61
To qualify as a Rule 412(b) (2) exception, the evidence6 2 must
meet a two-part test. First, the evidence must be "otherwise
admissible" under the other rules of evidence.63 Next, the proba-
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D.
Va. 1995). In Sheffield, Shanon Sheffield, a waitress, sued her restaurant's
corporate owner for sexual harassment. See id. at 106. She alleged that James
Bambery, the restaurant's manager, subjected her to a sexually hostile
environment by making repeated sexually suggestive comments and gestures
toward her, and committed quid pro quo harassment by assigning her extra
work when she complained. See id. at 106-107. The defendant sought to
introduce the testimony of Bambery and other employees that Sheffield often
participated in "sexually provocative discussions and activities" at work. Id. at
109. Sheffield sought to exclude this evidence under Rule 412. See id. The
defendant contended that Rule 412 was inapplicable, because the defense
sought to prove only that she welcomed Bambery's conduct, and not that she
engaged in sexual behavior or had a sexual predisposition. See id. at 108. The
court, however, held that, "[e]vidence relating to the plaintiffs speech is
certainly evidence offered to prove an alleged victim's 'sexual predisposition."'
Id. See also Arno v. Club Med Inc., Civ. No. 89-20656 SW, 1995 WL 380124, at *3
(N.D. Cal. June 22, 1995) (finding that sexually provocative clothing was within
the scope of Rule 412 as evidence of sexual predisposition). But seeJanopoulos
v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., No. 93 C 5176, 1995 WL 107170, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 7, 1995) (marital history is not within the scope of Rule 412).
60. "Rule 412 does not . . . apply unless the person against whom the
evidence is offered can reasonably be characterized as a 'victim of alleged
sexual misconduct.'" FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
61. See supra note 50.
62. "Evidence" in Rule 412(b) (2) means, "evidence offered to prove the
sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim" of sexual
misconduct. FED. R. EVID. 412(b) (2). It does not include, however, evidence of
the alleged victim's reputation. Such evidence is only admissible if the victim
herself put her reputation in controversy. FED. R. EvID. 412(b) (2).
63. See FED. R. EWD. 412(b) (2); see also Pizzino v. J. Dillard Hutchens
Corp., No. 95-0034-D, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14291 (W.D. Va. Aug. 8, 1996). In
Pizzino, a cashier at a supermarket sued the corporation that owned the
supermarket for sexual harassment after the president of the corporation
repeatedly directed her to stock shelves with him, and allegedly touched her
buttocks, genital area, breasts, and other private body areas on these occasions.
See id. at *3-4. She sought to exclude evidence at trial that she flirted with male
salesmen who frequented the store, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible
under Rule 412. See id. at *4. The court found that evidence of her flirtatious
conduct had little probative value in demonstrating that she did not find her
environment to be hostile because there was no evidence that her flirtations
were non-consensual, because she initiated the flirtations, and because the
298 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
tive value of the evidence must, "substantially outweigh[I] the
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any
party."6 4  Significantly, this second requirement substantially
heightens the standard of relevancy that evidence normally must
meet to be admissible.6" Further, it shifts the burden, "to the
proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than making the
opponentjustify exclusion of the evidence."66 Finally, even if the
evidence meets the test established in Rule 412(b) (2), the party
who wishes to admit the evidence must comply with certain pro-
salesmen were not her subordinates. See id. at *8-9. The court further found
under Rule 403 that this limited probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger that the jury would be confused and unfairly prejudiced against her.
See id. at *9. Thus, the court granted her motion to exclude evidence under
Rule 412 by finding that the evidence failed to meet the requirements of
another rule of evidence. See id.
64. FED. R. EVID. 412(b) (2). See, e.g., Cacciavillano v. Ruscello, Inc., No.
95-5754, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16528 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1996). In Cacciavillano,
Anne Marie Cacciavillano, a waitress, sued her employer for sexual harassment
under Title VII, alleging that her supervisors touched her, grabbed her, flashed
her, and treated her poorly for refusing to give them sexual favors. See id. at *1.
The defendants sought to admit evidence under Rule 412. See id. Specifically,
they sought to admit evidence that she often wrapped her suspenders around
her breasts suggestively, that she grabbed her breasts on one occasion and
asked a sixteen-year old busboy if he liked them, that on another occasion she
unbuttoned her shirt exposing her cleavage with a banana in her pants, that she
once waited on a table of customers with her shirt unbuttoned, that she once
removed a mint from a male co-worker's mouth with her tongue, and that she
discussed sex with her co-workers and exchanged sexual jokes with them. See id.
at *1-2. The court found that her sexually suggestive and flirtatious conduct
had little probative value to determine whether she subjectively found her
supervisors' conduct to be offensive, or whether a reasonable woman would
find such conduct offensive. See id. at *5. The court further found that the
evidence was "unfair and prejudicial" to Cacciavillano. Id. at *6. Thus, the
court determined that the probative value of the evidence was, "too weak to
substantially outweigh its danger of harm and unfair prejudice." Id.
65. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if it has,
.any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. However, even if the evidence meets
this low threshold, a judge may exclude evidence, "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403
(emphasis added). Thus, by reversing the balancing test of Rule 403 to require
that the probative value of evidence, "substantially outweigh[ ] the danger of
harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party," Rule 412(b) (2)
significantly raises the quantum of relevance that normally must be
demonstrated to admit evidence.
66. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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cedural requirements of Rule 412(c) by seeking an in camera
hearing to establish the admissibility of the evidence.67
Within the context of discovery, the Advisory Committee has
noted that the procedural requirements of Rule 412(c) are inap-
plicable.68 Rather, the discovery of prior sexual conduct or pre-
disposition in civil cases remains governed by Rule 26.69
However, the Advisory Committee asserted that, "[i] n order not
to undermine the rationale of Rule 412 . . . courts should enter
appropriate orders pursuant to [Rule] 26(c) to protect the victim
against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality." 70
Specifically, the Advisory Committee asserted that, "[c]ourts
should presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery
unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that the evi-
dence . . . would be relevant under the facts and theories of the
particular case, and cannot be obtained except through discov-
ery."'71 As an example, the Advisory Committee stated that in an
action for sexual harassment, "while some evidence of the
alleged victim's sexual behavior [or] predisposition in the work-
place may be relevant, non-work place conduct usually will be
irrelevant. '72 Further, the Advisory Committee stated that courts
should presumptively grant confidentiality orders.73
What is significant about the Advisory Committee's com-
mentary regarding discovery is the apparent shift that the Com-
mittee advocates in the burden of proof that is needed to obtain
a protective order precluding discovery. As noted previously,
under Rule 26(c), the person seeking to limit discovery usually
67. See FED. R. EVID. 412(c); see also Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co.,
895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 1995). In Sheffield, Shanon Sheffield filed a motion
in limine to exclude, "all testimony and/or exhibits which pertain[ed] to her
sexual history with persons other than [her harasser]." Id. at 107. The
defendant answered by summarizing the testimony of the witnesses that the
defendant planned to introduce, and by requesting that, should the court
consider the testimony to be within the scope of Rule 412, it accept the
response as a motion to present evidence under Rule 412(c). See id. However,
the defendant had not placed its response to the plaintiff's motion under seal,
as is required of Rule 412(c) motions under Rule 412(c) (2). See id. Therefore,
as a sanction for the defendant's, "callous disregard of the procedural
safeguards articulated in Rule 412(c)," the court excluded all the testimony that
Sheffield sought to exclude and that the defendant sought to admit under Rule
412. Id. at 109.




72. See id. (citing Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962-
63 (8th Cir. 1993)).
73. See id.
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bears the burden to establish "good cause" that the protective
order is necessary."4 This generally means that the party seeking
to limit discovery must show that the information will cause her,
"annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense," and that this outweighs her opponent's need for the
information.75 Under the Advisory Committee's interpretation
of Rule 412, however, this burden should shift to the party seek-
ing discovery to show that the evidence would be relevant and
that it is unavailable without discovery. Further, while judges are
given broad discretion under Rule 26(c) to limit discovery as they
deem necessary,76 the Advisory Committee's comment to Rule
412 suggests that judges preclude all questions involving the sex-
ual history or predisposition of an alleged victim of sexual
misconduct.
At the very least, this language indicates that judges should
consider Rule 412 when issuing protective orders in discovery dis-
putes involving an alleged victim's sexual history. A more expan-
sive reading of this language would dictate that judges run the
disputed discovery through the balancing test of Rule 412(b) (2)
to determine whether the evidence is, "relevant under the facts
and theories of the particular case."7 7 This would suggest a
higher standard of good cause than that required of parties wish-
ing to preclude discovery, who normally must show a particular
need for protection that outweighs the opposing party's need for
the evidence.7" The apparent shift in the burden of showing
good cause, as well as the higher standard of good cause, present
a conflict between the policy underlying Rule 412 and the policy
underlying Rule 26." To understand how courts have resolved
this policy conflict, and to understand how courts ought to
resolve this policy conflict, it is necessary to compare how courts
resolved these discovery disputes both before and after the
amendments to Rule 412.
III. How THE COURTS HAVE RESOLVED DISCOVERY DISPUTES
INVOLVING SEXUAL CONDUCT OR PREDISPOSITION EVIDENCE
As previously discussed, 0 discoverability is broader under
Rule 26 than admissibility. However, the two concepts are interre-
lated. To determine whether a request for discovery of a party's
74. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
75. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
76. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
77. FED. R. EVD. 412 advisory committee's note.
78. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
80. See supra Part II.A.
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sexual conduct or predisposition "appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"81 under Rule
26(b), it is essential to understand the underlying theories of
admissibility. Likewise, to assess whether the weight of evidence
outweighs its potential to embarrass, annoy, or oppress the other
party,82 it is necessary to understand theories of admissibility.
Consequently, this section begins by surveying some common
theories under which evidence of an individual's sexual conduct
or predisposition could be admitted.8"
A. The Admissibility of Evidence Concerning a Party's Prior Sexual
Conduct or Predisposition
Under Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence
of a person's character is generally inadmissible if it is offered to
prove that the person's actions on a given occasion conformed to
her character. 84 Moreover, evidence of her prior actions show-
ing such a character trait is likewise inadmissible if it is offered
for the same purpose." Thus, for example, a defendant in a sex-
ual harassment action could not use evidence that the plaintiff
engaged in prior sexual conduct to prove that she is a promiscu-
ous person, and that therefore she, and not the alleged harasser,
must have initiated sexual conduct.86 However, the defendant
could use the evidence to prove something other than that the
plaintiff is promiscuous and thus must have acted promiscuously
with her harasser.87 Therefore, for evidence of a party's sexual
81. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
82. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
83. The purpose of this section is to examine briefly various theories of
admissibility that parties commonly argue to admit evidence of a sexual nature.
It is the author's intention to provide a framework that will make the
subsequent discussion of cases involving discovery disputes somewhat more
comprehensible. It is not the author's intention to provide a comprehensive
analysis of theories of admissibility relating to sexual evidence.
84. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion.").
85. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.").
86. See, e.g., Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 758 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("It is
therefore clear at the outset that the information which defendant seeks to
discover regarding plaintiff's sexual history would be inadmissible to prove her
propensity to act in conformity therewith.").
87. "[Character evidence] may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... " FED. R. EVtD.
404(b).
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behavior or predisposition to be admissible at trial, the propo-
nent of the evidence must argue a theory of admissibility that
avoids the prohibition of Rule 404.
One theory that employers may argue to enter evidence of a
plaintiffs prior sexual conduct in a sexual harassment suit is that
because she engaged in the sexual conduct, it is more likely that
she "welcomed" her harasser's conduct.38 In Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson,89 the United States Supreme Court established that in
a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,90 a plaintiff is required to prove that her har-
asser's conduct was "unwelcome."91 In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson
asserted that her supervisor subjected her to several demands for
sexual favors at work, fondled her in front of her co-workers,
accompanied her to the woman's restroom, exposed himself to
her, and raped her.92 The district court found that she was not a
victim of sexual discrimination under Title VII, in part, because it
concluded that her sexual relationship with her supervisor was
"voluntary."93 The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia reversed, finding that Vinson's voluntariness
88. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987); Mitchell
v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Utah 1987). Many commentators have
been highly critical of the welcomeness inquiry, and the use of evidence of a
plaintiff's prior sexual behavior to show that she "welcomed" her harasser's
conduct. See Estrich, supra note 8, at 826-34; Juliano, supra note 9, passim;
Jennifer E. Smith, Note, Fine Tuning the Wrong Balance: Why the New Rule 412 Does
Not Go Far Enough to End Harassment in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 10 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 76-87 (1995);Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in
Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621 (1997). While these commentators present very good arguments for
reexamining this theory of admissibility, it remains "good law."
89. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1994).
91. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 ("The gravaman of any sexual harassment
claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'" (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (a) (1985) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Sex))); see Estrich, supra note 8, at 826-34
(discussing and criticizing the "unwelcomeness" standard in sexual harassment
law); Juliano, supra note 9, passim (same).
92. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
93. Id. at 61. The district court interpreted Title VII discrimination based
on sex to provide relief to a woman only if she could demonstrate that her
employer withheld from her a tangible or economic job benefit because of her
gender. See id. at 64. Because the court found that her "voluntary" relationship
with her supervisor had "'nothing to do with her continued employment at
[the bank] or her advancement or promotions at that institution,'" the court
concluded that she was not a victim under Title VII. Id. at 61 (alteration in
original) (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 43
(D.D.C. 1983), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom, Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
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was irrelevant.9 4 The court determined that the district court's
finding that Vinson's sexual relationship with her supervisor was
"voluntary" may have been based on testimony concerning Vin-
son's clothing and her sexual fantasies.95 The Court of Appeals
considered this testimony to have, "'no place in th[e]
litigation.' "96
While affirming the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Vin-
son's voluntariness was irrelevant,97 the Supreme Court nonethe-
less disagreed with the court's conclusion that testimony
concerning Vinson's clothing and fantasies, "had no place in
th[e] litigation."98 Because the Supreme Court found that a sex-
ual harassment plaintiff under Title VII must demonstrate that
her harasser's conduct was "unwelcome," the Court determined
that "the correct inquiry" was whether she, "by her conduct indi-
cated that the alleged [harassment was] unwelcome."99 The
Court concluded that evidence of Vinson's sexually provocative
clothing and speech was "obviously relevant" to whether she indi-
cated that her supervisor's conduct was unwelcome.1 °° Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court in Meritor not only established that a
Title VII sexual harassment plaintiff must demonstrate that her
harasser's conduct was unwelcome, but that a court can consider
the plaintiff's own sexual conduct to determine if she found her
harasser's conduct to be unwelcome.101 While courts have given
evidence of a sexual harassment plaintiff's prior sexual conduct
varying amounts of weight in determining whether to admit the
evidence to show that she welcomed the harassment,10 2 courts
94. See id. at 62. The circuit court held that a Title VII claim for sexual
discrimination can be predicated either on quid pro quo harassment, which the
district court found did not exist, or on a hostile or offensive working
environment, which the district court had failed to consider. See id. The court
concluded that if Vinson's tolerance of a hostile environment was a condition
of her employment, "her voluntariness 'had no materiality whatsoever.'" Id.
(quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom,
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
95. See id. at 63.
96. Id. (quoting Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146 n.36).
97. See id. at 68 ("The correct inquiry is whether [Vinson] by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her
actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.").
98. Id. at 68-69.
99. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 69.
101. See Estrich, supra note 8, at 828 (arguing that the unwelcomeness
standard shifts the focus from the harasser to the victim, whose "'conduct' is
the yardstick by which we measure assent.").
102. See Sloan, supra note 9, at 384-89 (discussing three standards of
admissibility that have resulted from the courts' interpretation of Meritor,
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are constrained from automatically admitting evidence of a plain-
tiffs prior sexual conduct.11 3 Although the Supreme Court
stated that Mechelle Vinson's provocative speech and dress were
"obviously relevant" to determine whether she welcomed her
supervisor's advances, 104 it noted that courts, "must carefully
weigh the applicable considerations in deciding whether to
admit evidence of this kind.1 0 5 Thus, so long as evidence of a
sexual harassment plaintiffs prior sexual conduct falls within the
permissible parameters of the Federal Rules of Evidence,1 "6 an
ranging from carte blanche admissibility of a plaintiff's conduct, to a test that
balances the probative value of the conduct against its tendency to unfairly
prejudice a jury under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, to a test that admits
evidence of a plaintiffs conduct only if it occurred within the context of the
workplace, and only if the alleged harasser was aware of the plaintiff's conduct);
see a/soJuliano, supra note 9, at 1578-87 (discussing two tests to determine if the
harasser's conduct was unwelcome, one which examines the totality of the
circumstances, and one which considers whether plaintiff by her conduct
solicited the harassment).
103. But see Sloan, supra note 9, at 384-85. Sloan argues that some courts
have considered Meritor to provide, "a strong argument in favor of automatic
admission and consideration of evidence concerning the plaintiffs conduct."
Id. at 384. To support her argument, she cited a footnote in Jones v. Wesco
Investments, Inc., 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988), in which the court cited Meritor
as standing for the proposition that a, "court must consider any provocative
speech or dress of the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case." Id. at 1155 n.4
(citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69). The admissibility of evidence concerning the
plaintiffs sexual conduct, however, was not an issue before the Wesco court.
Sloan also cited Weiss v. Amoco Oil, Co., 142 F.R.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992), as a
court that, "interpreted Meritor as having demanded the automatic admission of
evidence of the plaintiffs prior sexual conduct that was known to the
defendant." Sloan, supra note 9, at 385. However, the court in Weiss was not
concerned with admissibility, but with discoverability, which is broader than
admissibility. Moreover, the discovery request at issue in Weiss was "exactly
tailored to be in keeping with" Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah
1987). Weiss, 142 F.R.D. at 316. According to Sloan, however, Mitchell
represented another standard of admissibility that, "severely limit[ed] the
admissibility . . . of evidence concerning the plaintiffs prior sexual conduct."
Sloan, supra note 9, at 386. Because of such weak support, the author finds
Sloan's argument unpersuasive.
104. See Meitor, 477 U.S. at 69.
105. Id. at 69.
106. The "applicable considerations" to which the Court in Meritor
referred are found in Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 412 today provides further constraints on the admissibility of evidence of a
plaintiff's prior sexual conduct.
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant only if it has a, "tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 401. Evidence is only admissible at trial if it meets this threshold. See FED.
R. EVID. 402. See, e.g., Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987).
In Swentek, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded
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employer can use such evidence at trial to demonstrate that she
welcomed her harasser's conduct.
A second theory that employers may argue to gain the
admittance of evidence of an employee's prior sexual history is
that the evidence is necessary to demonstrate that factors other
than the harasser's conduct caused the employee's alleged dam-
ages, or that the damages are not as extensive as the employee
has claimed."°7 Prior to 1991, a prevailing Title VII sexual harass-
ment plaintiff was permitted to recover from her employer only
equitable relief and attorney's fees.' °8 Congress, however, as part
that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of the plaintiff's use of foul
language and sexual conduct to demonstrate that she welcomed her alleged
harasser's conduct. See id. The court stated that, "[p]laintiff's use of foul
language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal
protections against unwelcome harassment."' Id. (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983)). Unlike the situation in Meritor, the court found
that there was no evidence that the alleged harasser knew of the plaintiffs
conduct, or that the harasser believed that the plaintiff welcomed his conduct.
See id.
Under Rule 403, even evidence that passes the threshold test of Rules 401
and 402 can be excluded if, "its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. See, e.g., Pizzino v.J. Dillard Hutchens
Corp., No. 95-0034-D, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14291 (W.D. Va. Aug. 8, 1996). In
Pizzino, a cashier at a supermarket sued the corporation that owned the
supermarket for sexual harassment, alleging that the president of the
corporation touched her private body areas. See id. at *3-4. Pizzino sought to
exclude evidence at trial that she made sexual advances to male salesmen who
frequented the store. See id. at *6. The court granted her motion to exclude
the evidence, finding that because there was no evidence that her flirtations
were non-consensual, because she initiated the flirtations, and because the
salesmen were not her subordinates, evidence of her flirtatious conduct with
them had little probative value in demonstrating that she did not find her
supervisor's unwelcome advances to create a hostile environment. See id. at *8-
9. This limited probative value, the court found, was substantially outweighed
by the danger that the jury would be confused and unfairly prejudiced against
her. See id. at *9. But see McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95 C 23,
1995 WL 57124, at *34 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1995) (finding that the Rule 403 test
favored defendant when evidence of the plaintiffs' pre-adolescent and
adolescent sexual abuse demonstrated that defendant may not have been the
source of the plaintiffs' alleged damages for emotional distress).
107. See Krieger & Fox, supra note 7, at 124-25 (discussing emotional
distress damages in the context of compelled mental examinations under Rule
35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-5(g), 5(k) (1994). The text of the statute states
in relevant part:
(g) (1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,109 expanded the relief available to
Title VII plaintiffs to include compensatory and punitive dam-
ages." Thus, since 1991, Title VII sexual harassment plaintiffs
have often included in their complaints claims for emotional
damages due to the alleged harassment."' Furthermore, even if
the damage provisions of the 1991 Act are inapplicable to an
action for sexual harassment, 1 2 a plaintiff may still include
claims for emotional damages under state tort theories" 3 or
under state statutory schemes." 4  Hence, depending on the
nature of a plaintiffs claim for emotional damages, 1 5 her
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay.., or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate ...
(k) In any action or proceeding under this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e(17)] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party... a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs...
Id. See also Estrich, supra note 8, at 853-58 (discussing liability limits in Title VII
sexual harassment law as it existed prior to the enactment of Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (a) (1994)) (providing for compensatory and punitive damages in
a Title VII sexual harassment suit)).
109. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The text of the statute states in relevant
part:
(a) (1) In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706
or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 [or 2000e-
16]) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination . . . prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the
Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 [or 2000e-16]) . . . the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages . . . in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)], from the
respondent.
Id.
111. See, e.g., Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l, 163 F.R.D. 617, 619 (D. Utah
1995); McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95 C 23, 1995 WL 571324, at
*3-4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1995).
112. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively. See
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
113. See, e.g., Longmire v. Alabama State Univ., 151 F.R.D. 414, 416 (M.D.
Ala. 1992) (allowing claims for assault, invasion of privacy, and outrageous
conduct); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 483 (D. Utah 1987)
(permitting claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
114. See, e.g., Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (allowing claim to be brought under New York Human Rights Law, N.Y.
EXEC. LAw § 296(1) (a) (McKinney 1982)).
115. Evidence of the plaintiffs prior sexual conduct may or may not be
relevant to her damages claim, depending on how she characterized the
damages. See, e.g., Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL
117886 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995). In Alberts, a sexual harassment plaintiff
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employer may be able to persuade a court to admit evidence of
her sexual conduct to rebut her claim of causation,116 or to
demonstrate that her damages were not as extensive as she
alleged. 17
One theory that plaintiffs may argue to have evidence of an
alleged harasser's prior sexual conduct admitted is that the har-
asser by his conduct created a sexually hostile working environ-
ment.'1 8 An essential element of a sexual harassment claim that
alleged that as a result of her harasser's attempted rape, she was unable to
engage in sexual relationships. See id. at *5. The court held that the defendant
was permitted in discovery to ask her what incidents of sexual intimacy she was
referring to because she had, "injected into the very heart of her damages claim
her inability to engage in intimate sexual relationships." Id. See also James v.
Miller, No. 86 C 10081, 1988 WL 72290 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1988). In James, the
court permitted the defendant to ask questions about a sexual harassment
plaintiff's sexual relationship with her husband, because she sought damages
for the decline in frequency of sexual relations with her husband. See id. at *1.
But see Bottomly v. Leucadia National, 163 F.R.D. 617 (D. Utah 1995), in which
the court precluded discovery of plaintiff Jennifer Bottomly's prior
relationships because they were not related to the causation and extent of her
damages, but, "merely [went] to [her] character[, and were] outside of proper
bounds of discovery." Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
116. See, for example, McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95 C 23,
1995 WL 571324 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1995), in which sexual harassment plaintiffs
sought to exclude from trial evidence of childhood and adolescent sexual
abuse. See id. at *1. They sought damages for humiliation and emotional
suffering. See id. at *2. During discovery, however, the defendant learned that
after the alleged harassment, the plaintiffs never told their doctors or therapist
that they had been harassed, but disclosed their childhood abuse in discussing
their emotional suffering. See id. Thus, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion,
because the evidence demonstrated that the alleged harassment may not have
been the cause of their emotional distress, and because this probative value was
not outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice or undue delay under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. See id.
117. See, e.g., Bottomly, 163 F.R.D. at 620 ("[E]xpert testimony . . . is
admissible as probative of damages and causation .... However, matter that is
not related to causation and extent of damage. . . is outside of proper bounds of
discovery." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Ramirez v. Nabil's,
Inc., Civ.A. No. 94-2396-GTV, 1995 WL 609415, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995)
(granting defendant's motion to compel a sexual harassment plaintiff to release
prior medical and psychiatric records, that may disclose, "conditions and
experiences . . . [that] may themselves be the cause of some or all of the
emotional distress."). But see Bottomly, 163 F.R.D. at 620 ("If the victim was
vulnerable and psychologically feeble, the harasser must accept the condition
of the person who was subjected to the improper conduct."). See also Mitchell v.
Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 484-85 (D. Utah 1987) (defendants not permitted to
discover evidence of a sexual harassment plaintiffs sexual past to demonstrate
that because promiscuous people are less likely to be offended by sexual
harassment, the plaintiff suffered less extensive damages).
118. See Baer et al., supra note 7, at 851-52; Krieger & Fox, supra note 7, at
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is predicated on the hostile environment theory 19 is that the
harasser by, "severe or pervasive" conduct, 120 "create [d] an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment - environment that a
reasonable person 121 would find hostile or abusive," and that the
victim herself found abusive. 122 Hence, the victim of a hostile
working environment may be able to enter evidence of her har-
asser's conduct toward other women in the workplace to demon-
strate that his harassing conduct was pervasive and objectively
hostile. 123
119. See Juliano, supra note 9, at 1566-74, for an overview of the hostile
environment theory in sexual harassment law. See Estrich, supra note 8, at 839-
47 for a critical examination of the hostile environment theory.
120. See Estrich, supra note 8, at 843-47 (discussing and criticizing the
pervasive requirement). Estrich ultimately concludes that, "the degree of
pervasiveness should be a measure of relief, rather than a requirement to
establish a violation." Id. at 858.
121. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
female Title VII plaintiff states a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment, "when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive working environment." (emphasis added) (citations and
footnotes omitted)); see alsojuliano, supra note 9, at 1571-72 (discussing Ellison
within the context of other tests to establish a hostile environment claim).
122. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); see also Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) ("For sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(lth Cir. 1982))). Other elements that make out a prima facie claim for
sexual harassment under the hostile environment theory include: (1) that the
employee is part of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome
sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on her gender; and (4)
that the employer knew of the harassment and failed to take appropriate
action. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05. See alsoJuliano, supra note 9, at 1569-72
(discussing the Henson test, which, "remains the primary test for establishing
sexual harassment under Title VII," id at 1571, as well as other tests).
123. See, e.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D.D.C. 1988)
(holding that the, "consensual sexual relations [of an employee's supervisors
with persons other than herself], in exchange for tangible employment
benefits, while possibly not creating a cause of action for the recipient of such
sexual advances who does not find them unwelcome, do . . . create and
contribute to a sexually hostile working environment."). But see Biggs v.
Nicewonger Co., 897 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D. Or. 1995) (granting defendant's
motion to exclude evidence of a supervisor's sexually-harassing conduct that
was unwitnessed by and unrelated to the plaintiff, finding it irrelevant to her
claim). See also McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95 C 23, 1995 WL
571324, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1995) (granting defendant's motion to
exclude evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 of a non-party's
complaint of sexual harassment by someone other than the plaintiffs' alleged
harasser.) In McCleland, the court found that the slight probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the
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Another element that is essential to state a sexual harass-
ment claim predicated on the hostile environment theory is that,
"the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take prompt remedial action."124 Evi-
dence of the alleged harasser's prior sexual conduct may estab-
lish that the employer, "knew or should have known of the
harassment in question. '  Hence, a plaintiff may be able to
enter evidence of her harasser's sexual conduct to establish that
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, and
failed to take appropriate action.
1 26
Finally, under the quid pro quo theory of liability for sexual
harassment, 12 a plaintiff must establish that, "[t]he acceptance
or rejection of the harassment . . . [was] an express or implied
condition to the receipt of ajob benefit or the cause of a tangible
job detriment[.]" ' 128  Evidence that someone other than the
likely confusion of issues, and the likely waste of time in trying a collateral issue.
See id.
124. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. The Supreme Court, while not defining a
particular standard for employer liability in hostile environment suits, has
found that, "Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance
in this area." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
125. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. See, for example, Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Cal. 1990), in which three former employees of the
defendant alleged that their supervisor engaged in sexual harassment against
them, and against other employees prior to their employment. See id. at 549.
The plaintiffs alleged that the employer, "knew or should have known of [the
alleged harasser's] prior conduct," and they sought in discovery the telephone
numbers and addresses of each female employee who had worked with their
supervisor. Id. at 549-50. Although the court found that the former female
employees had a privacy interest in not having their names and addresses
disclosed, and that the defendant had an obligation to preserve that privacy
interest, the court found that the information sought was "highly relevant," and
held that the privacy interest was outweighed by the importance of the
information. See id. at 551-52. But see Longmire v. Alabama State Univ., 151
F.R.D. 414 (M.D. Ala. 1992). While acknowledging that a hostile environment
plaintiff must establish that her employer knew or should have known of her
harasser's conduct, the Longmire court held that evidence of an alleged
harasser's harassing conduct towards other women prior to the plaintiff's
employment, and his harassing conduct prior to his employment with the
defendant was "absolutely irrelevant." Id. at 417-18.
126. See Krieger & Fox, supra note 7, at 134.
127. SeeJuliano, supra note 9, at 1565-66, for an overview of the quid pro
quo theory of sexual harassment liability. See Estrich, supra note 8, at 834-39,
for a critical examination of the quid pro quo theory.
128. Henson, 682 F.2d at 909 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981)
("Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
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plaintiff submitted to her supervisor's sexual advances and
received a benefit that the supervisor denied the plaintiff can
demonstrate that receipt of the benefit was conditioned on the
employee's submission to the advances. 129 Therefore, evidence
of an alleged harasser's sexual relationships with the plaintiff's
co-workers may be admissible to prove that his adverse action
towards her or his refusal to grant her a job benefit was a
response to her refusal to submit to his harassing conduct.'
It is in light of theories of admissibility such as these"' that
courts assess the strength of evidence concerning a party's sexual
conduct that is at issue in a discovery dispute. Even if a court
determines that such evidence is strong enough to pass the
threshold test of Rule 26(b) (1),132 the court still must weigh its
strength against the opposing privacy interests of the party
affected by its disclosure. 13 To understand the effect that the
1994 amendments to Rule 412 have had on discovery disputes
involving sexual evidence, it is necessary next to examine the
cases prior to and subsequent to the enactment of Rule 412.
B. Cases Analyzing Evidence of a Party's Sexual Conduct or
Predisposition in a Discovery Dispute Prior to the
Amendments to Rule 412.
The first reported sexual harassment case to resolve a discov-
ery dispute in which a party sought to elicit information about his
opponent's sexual conduct was Priest v. Rotary.'34 Evelyn Priest, a
waitress at a bar owned by George Rotary, alleged that between
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual .... ")).
129. See, for example, King v. Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1984),
where the court found that liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment would
exist if, "a sexual relationship is solicited by or given the supervisor and favored
treatment by the supervisor results as the payoff ." Id. at 68-69. But where the
harassment is based on a mere sexual attraction, "plaintiff must fairly and
squarely meet the issue by positive proof ... [as opposed to] rumor, knowing
winks and prurient overtones." Id. at 69. But see DeCintio v. Westchester
County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that, "voluntary,
romantic relationships cannot form the basis of a sex discrimination suit under
... Title VII.").
130. See Baer et al., supra note 7, at 851-52.
131. The foregoing discussion is by no means comprehensive. See supra
note 83.
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
133. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text; see also Baer et al., supra
note 7, at 852-57 (examining how courts have weighed the probative value of
evidence concerning a harasser's sexual conduct against the constitutional right
of privacy).
134. 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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February and June of 1978, Rotary sexually harassed her by sub-
jecting her to a sexually hostile environment, and by firing her
when she refused to submit to his sexual advances. 135 Rotary
contended that Priest herself was the sexual aggressor in their
relationship, and that he fired her after she attempted to "pick
up" male customers.136 During her deposition, Rotary attempted
to obtain highly detailed information concerning Priest's sexual
conduct. 137 After Priest refused to answer these questions,
Rotary sought to compel her to answer the questions, and Priest
sought a protective order under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 13 8 The United States Magistrate granted
Priest the protective order, and Rotary sought reconsideration.
1 39
On reconsideration, the court first considered whether the
information Rotary sought met the relevance standard of Rule
26(b) (1).14 ° Rotary contended that the evidence he sought
established that Priest had a "habit" of, "living with men to derive
economic benefit from them[.] 4"'  Although "habit" evidence is
distinguished from character evidence that is prohibited by Rule
404, 142 the court held that, "repeated instances of living with
other persons for economic benefit will not establish a habit."'
' 43
135. See id. at 756.
136. Id.
137. See id. Rotary's counsel asked Priest the following questions:
(1) Have you had any sexual relations with any gentlemen since
leaving employment at the Fireside? Would you tell me those person's
names?
(2) Have you had any sexual relations with any man prior to June 23 of
1978, other than . . . those men that you listed yesterday .. .?
(3) In 1977 did you proposition any man for sexual relations?
(4) . . . Would you tell me the name of each person that you have had
sexual relations with for the last ten years?
(5) Would you tell me the names [sic] of each individual that have
[sic] sexually propositioned you in the last ten years?
(6) Have you ever sexually propositioned any man within the last ten
years?
Id. n.1 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
138. See id. at 756-57.
139. See id. at 757.
140. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
141. Priest, 98 F.R.D. at 758.
142. See FED. R. EVID. 406 ("Evidence of the habit of a person . . . is
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person ... on a particular occasion
was in conformity with the habit.").
143. Priest, 98 F.R.D. at 759 (discussing Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d
265, 271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that weekly observance of the Sabbath by
an Orthodox Jew was not evidence of habit)). The Priest court reasoned that,
"[ilf an individual's religious practices do not properly constitute a habit, then
clearly neither do characteristics of one's personal relationships." Priest, 98
F.R.D. at 759.
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Rotary further argued that he sought the evidence to establish
that Priest had a motive 144 to retaliate against him by falsely
accusing him of sexual harassment. 145 The court, however,
found that Rotary failed to establish, "the connection between
[Priest's] past relationships and a desire for retaliation against
him [.]"146 Rotary finally argued that the information he sought
established that Priest had a desire for economic enrichment,
and that this desire constituted a motive to meet male customers
while working for him.' 4 7 The court, however, found, "nothing
about [Priest's] past relationships [that was] specifically relevant
to [her] conduct as a cocktail waitress at [Rotary's] bar."' 48 Con-
sequently, the court concluded that the discovery Rotary sought
failed to meet the requirements of Rule 26(b) (1). 1'
The court next considered whether a protective order was
proper under Rule 26(c).' 5 ° The court expressed concern that
questions such as the ones that George Rotary sought to com-
pel' 5 ' had "the clear potential to discourage sexual harassment
litigants from prosecuting lawsuits[.]' 1 5 2 The court found that
this result, "clearly contravene[d] the remedial effect intended
by Congress in enacting Title VII[.]' 53 Indeed, the court found
that, "[s] exual harassment plaintiffs would appear to require par-
ticular protection from this sort of intimidation and discourage-
ment if the statutory cause of action . . . is to have meaning."154
What is particularly instructive about the court's policy analysis is
that it in essence anticipated the 1994 amendments to Rule 412.
After discussing the "similar state of affairs [that] once con-
144. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of "motive" is an
express exception to the general prohibition against character evidence. See
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).




149. See id. at 761.
150. See FED. R. Ciy. P. 26(c). In discussing the policy conflict between
liberal discovery and the privacy interests of Evelyn Priest, the court stated that,
"[w]hen a discovery request 'approach[es] the outer bounds of relevance and
the information requested may only marginally enhance the objectives of
providing information to the parties or narrowing the issues, the Court must
then weigh that request with the hardship to the party from whom the discovery
is sought.'" Priest, 98 F.R.D. at 761 (alteration in original) (quoting Carlson
Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (D. Minn. 1974)).
151. See supra note 137.
152. Priest, 98 F.R.D. at 761.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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fronted victims . . . [of] rape,"'55 and the consequent enactment
of Rule 412, the court stated that, "courts and [the] bar can avoid
repeating in this new field of civil sexual harassment suits the
same mistakes that are now being corrected in the rape con-
text."1" 6 The court concluded, "in the context of civil suits for
sexual harassment, and absent extraordinary circumstances,
inquiry into such areas should not be permitted, either in discov-
ery or at trial." '157 Consequently, the court granted Priest a pro-
tective order prohibiting any inquiry into her prior sexual
conduct.1 5 8
In Mitchell v. Hutchings,'59 the United States District Court
for the District of Utah articulated a standard that was not quite
as restrictive as the "absent extraordinary circumstances" stan-
dard articulated in Priest, but that nonetheless restricted the sexu-
ally-related questions defendants could ask sexual harassment
plaintiffs in discovery. In 1987, three Utah police officers sued
their City employer and officer Carl Hutchings for sexual harass-
ment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 6 ° Hutch-
ings and the City sought to depose three people with whom the
plaintiffs had allegedly engaged in sexual relations.'61 Hutchings
and the City also sought to depose a photographer who had
allegedly taken sexually suggestive pictures of the plaintiffs,162
another police officer who had been allegedly restrained by fel-
low officers while one of the plaintiffs fondled him, and a psy-
chologist who treated one of the plaintiffs for the distress that
Hutchings allegedly caused.' 6 '
The plaintiffs argued that Hutchings and the City were
attempting to elicit character evidence that is inadmissible under
Rule 404. 164 Further, they contended that the inquires were "cal-
culated to annoy, embarrass, and oppress" them.165 They sought
155. Id.
156. Id. at 762.
157. Id. The court rested this conclusion on the premise that, "even in
the criminal context, [the courts and Congress have concluded that] the use of
evidence of a complainant's past sexual behavior is more often harassing and
intimidating than genuinely probative, and the potential for prejudice
outweighs whatever probative value such evidence may have." Id.
158. See id.
159. 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987).
160. See id. at 483.
161. See id.
162. See id. The court stated that the pictures may have been taken of
one or more of the plaintiffs." Id.
163. See id.
164. See FED. R. EVil. 404.
165. Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 483.
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to quash the deposition subpoenas, and alternatively they sought
a protective order under Rule 26(c). 1 6 6 Hutchings and the City
argued that questions were necessary to determine whether the
plaintiffs had welcomed Hutchings' alleged conduct. 16 7 They
also argued that the information was necessary to demonstrate
that the plaintiffs were promiscuous, and thus less likely to be
distressed by Hutchings' alleged conduct. 168 They argued fur-
ther that they should be permitted to question the psychologist
concerning his patient's sexual behavior to determine whether
Hutchings caused her emotional damages and whether they were
as extensive as she had asserted. 169
Under Rule 26(b) (1),170 the court noted that if the evidence
were irrelevant and inadmissible, and if it did not, "appear that
the evidence sought [would] lead to evidence that is admissible,"
then it had the authority to limit the discovery. 171 Because the
evidence that the defendants sought to discover, "ha[d] a bear-
ing on the Title VII claim, on the emotional distress claim, on
character evidence and on damages," the court determined that
it would, "review what it consider[ed] to be the bounds of rele-
vant testimony[.] '172
The court acknowledged that under Meitor Savings Bank v.
Vinson173 it could examine the plaintiffs' conduct to determine
166. See id. at 482-83.
167. See id. at 483.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 485. The defendants also argued that evidence of the
plaintiffs' sexual behavior was admissible as "habit" evidence under Federal
Rule of Evidence 406. See id. at 483. The court, however, agreed with the
reasoning of the Priest court and concluded that evidence of prior sexual
behavior does not constitute evidence of "habit" under Rule 406 as an
exception to the general prohibition of character evidence. See id. at 485
(citing Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
Finally, the defendants argued that the information they sought was
necessary under Utah's law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See
id. at 483. Under Utah law, to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted intentionally either with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or with "outrageous" conduct that a
reasonable person would expect to result in emotional distress. See id. at 484
(citing Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (Utah 1961)). The Mitchell court
found that the requirement that Hutchings' conduct be outrageous was
measured by an objective standard, but would also require a jury to examine
Hutchings' conduct, "in the context of the working environment." Id. Thus,
the court concluded that, "all evidence of sexual behavior in the workplace
environment, whether known to the defendants or not, is relevant." Id.
170. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
171. Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 483-84.
172. Id. at 484.
173. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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whether they welcomed the alleged harassment.174 The court
determined that, "evidence relating to the work environment
where the alleged sexual harassment took place is obviously rele-
vant, if such conduct was known to .. . Hutchings." 17 5 However,
"evidence of sexual conduct which is remote in time or place to
plaintiffs' working environment is irrelevant." '76 Thus, the court
found that evidence that the plaintiffs engaged in sexual conduct
was inadmissible and unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence if it was unconnected to the workplace and if
Hutchings was unaware of it.177 The court further stated that,
"[g] iven the annoying and embarrassing nature of this discovery
... as a matter of law... Rule 26 ... preponderates against its
discoverability."' 78 The court concluded that the subpoenas of
the three sexual partners of the plaintiffs should be quashed
until Hutchings and the City could demonstrate that the partners
had information that was relevant.179 Further, the court con-
cluded that the photographer could be deposed, "but the only
photographs which [we]re pertinent to [the] litigation [we]re
those which [were] publicly displayed in the police station or pri-
vately displayed to the defendants. 18 0
In response to the argument that the information was rele-
vant to show that because the plaintiffs were promiscuous, they
were less likely to be distressed by Hutchings' harassment, the
court noted that "[p] ast sexual conduct does not. .. create emo-
174. See Mitchell 116 F.R.D. at 484 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69); see also
supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text (discussing Meitor).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. Evidence of the plaintiffs' sexual behavior that occurred at
work and of which Hutchings had no knowledge of was, however, admissible to
determine whether Hutchings' conduct was objectively outrageous to constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id.
178. Id. at 484.
179. See id. at 485-86.
180. Id. at 486; see also Douglass v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan, CIV.
A. No. 88-2257-S, 1989 WL 134548 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 1989). In Douglass, Susan
Douglass sued both her supervisor and her employer for sexual harassment
under Title VII and under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44-1001-1044 (1995). See id. at *1. The defendants sought to compel
the production of certain "boudoir" photographs of Douglass, arguing that they
were relevant to show that Douglass welcomed her harasser's conduct. See id.
The magistrate denied the defendants' motion, and, distinguishing Mitchell,
emphasized that the photographs of Douglass were not taken in the workplace,
and were neither displayed openly at work nor to the alleged harasser. See id. at
*1-2 (citing Mitchell 116 F.R.D. at 485). The defendants sought review of the
magistrate's order. See id. at *1. The court found that the magistrate correctly
limited the scope of the defendants' inquiry, "to information pertinent to the
work environment." Id. at *2 (citing Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 485).
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tional calluses that lessen the impact of unwelcomed sexual har-
assment." '181 Thus, the court found that their prior sexual
conduct had, "absolutely no bearing on the emotional trauma
they may feel from sexual harassment that is unwelcome.18 2 In
contrast to this argument, however, the court found that the,
"expert opinion relating to the extent of plaintiffs emotional
trauma and its causes is obviously relevant to the damages
issue." '83 Thus, the court permitted Hutchings and the City to
ask the psychologist about all the information on which he based
his expert opinion, and to ask him how other hypothetical infor-
mation, if known to him, would affect his opinion. 184
181. MitchelJ 116 F.R.D. at 485.
182. Id.
183. Id; see alsoJames v. Miller, No. 86 C 10081, 1988 WL 72290 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 1988). In James, the plaintiff alleged that due to sexual harassment, she
suffered emotional damages that "affected her whole life," and resulted in a
decline in the frequency of sexual relations with her husband. Id. at *1. The
court held that questions about the frequency with which she had had sex with
her husband both before and after the harassment were relevant under Rule
26(b) (1) to her damages claim. See id. But see Kennedy v. Fritsch, No. 90 C
5446, 1991 WL 277624 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1991). In Kennedy, three waitresses
sued a restaurant alleging sexual harassment under Title VII and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. See id. at *1. The defendants sought to compel
the discovery of detailed information about the plaintiffs' sexual activities
before, during, and after their employment, alleging that the plaintiffs put their
emotional and mental health at issue by asserting a Title VII and an emotional
distress claim. See id. While the court found that, "[tihe existence of difficulties
in the personal lives of plaintiffs contemporaneous with the alleged emotional
distress they suffered would effect a determination as to whether the alleged
conduct of the defendants caused the distress[,]" the court nonetheless found
that the defendants had, "already asked any questions reasonably calculated to
yield such information." Id. at *2. Thus, the court determined that the
additional questions regarding the plaintiffs' sexual lives were calculated merely
to "humiliate" them. Id.
184. See id; see also Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). In Bridges, Susan Bridges, Virginia D'Aponte and Kimberly
Muryasz sued Eastman Kodak and others for sexual harassment under Title VII
and under New York's Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1) (a)
(McKinney 1982). Bridges, 850 F. Supp. at 218. The plaintiffs sought to prove
that as a result of an abusive working environment, "they suffered injuries to
their psychological well-being including emotional pain, suffering and mental
anguish." Id. at 220-21. Eastman Kodak sought to ask the plaintiffs and their
therapists about the plaintiffs' psychological histories, and sought to obtain
their medical records. See id. at 222. The court held that questions about the
plaintiffs' psychological history were permissible because they asserted damages
for mental anguish. See id. at 223 (citations omitted). However, the court
emphasized that the defendants would not be permitted to "engage in a fishing
expedition by inquiring into matters totally irrelevant to the issue of emotional
distress[,]" but would be limited to inquiring about the cause and extent of the
emotional harm. Id. Citing both Mitchell and Priest, the court offered as an
example that, "it would be inappropriate for defendants to question plaintiffs
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The "remote in time or place" standard of Mitchell is obvi-
ously less restrictive than the "absent extraordinary circum-
stances" standard of Priest. This is understandable given that
Priest was decided prior to Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,'85 and
given that the plaintiffs in Mitchell, unlike the plaintiff in Priest,
were seeking damages for emotional trauma. Nonetheless, taken
in tandem, these two early cases illustrate a sensitivity of courts
both to the reality that in sexual harassment cases parties often
use sexual questions in discovery to intimidate their opponents,
and to the fact that there are circumstances under which such
evidence can be highly relevant. Subsequent courts facing simi-
lar discovery disputes would follow these two decisions.
One such court was the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa in Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co."8 6 In May of
1990, after Angel Streebin, an employee of Amoco Oil who had
occasionally dated Arnold Weiss, alleged that Weiss sexually
harassed her, Amoco Oil terminated Weiss's employment.18 7
Weiss sued Amoco Oil for wrongful discharge, and sought to
depose Streebin."'8 Streebin, who allegedly had pinned up cards
of a sexual nature at her work station, had sent another
employee a birthday card with sexual connotations, had made
sexual jokes with other employees, and had discussed her sexual
conduct at work, sought a protective order under Rule 26(c) to
prohibit the discovery of her sexual history.'" 9 Weiss requested
that he be permitted to inquire into Streebin's sexual activities
with Amoco Oil employees during her employment that he had
known about.1 90 Amoco argued 9 ' that such information was
irrelevant under Rule 26(b)(1), and was meant to harass
Streebin.19 2
The court noted that under Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson,19 3
evidence of a plaintiffs sexual past is, "relevant in assessing her
about their past sexual histories in order to show that sexually promiscuous
people are less likely to be offended, and thus less damaged, than those who are
not as sexually active." Id. at 223 n.5.
185. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
186. 142 F.R.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992)
187. See id. at 312-13.
188. See id. at 312.
189. See id. at 312-13.
190. See id. at 312.
191. Streebin did not submit a brief, but Amoco submitted a brief
supporting Streebin's motion that the court considered in ruling on the
motion. See id. at 312 n.1.
192. See id. at 314-15.
193. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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contact with her alleged harasser." '94 Further, the court noted
that unlike the situation in Mitchell v. Hutchings,19 Weiss did not
seek to discover information that was "remote in time or place"
to Streebin's employment, or that was unknown to him.196
Rather, the court found that Weiss's requested discovery was,
"exactly tailored to be in keeping with the Mitchell decision."197
The court concluded that the requested discovery was relevant
under Rule 26 to determine whether Streebin welcomed Weiss's
conduct, to explain, "the context of Weiss's words and actions
toward Streebin," 19 8 and to assess, "the thoroughness of Amoco's
investigation into Streebin's complaint of sexual harassment. "199
Thus, the court held that Streebin failed to meet her burden of
establishing "good cause" under Rule 26(c).2"'
Another case citing both Priest and Mitchell is Longmire v. Ala-
bama State University.2" 1 In Longmire, Venus Longmire, an
employee of Alabama State University, alleged that Dr. Leon
Howard, the University's former president, attempted to rape
her.20 2 Longmire filed charges against Howard with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and with Alabama's Eth-
ics Commission.20 3 In June of 1991, after the University termi-
nated her employment, Longmire sued the University, the
members of its Board of Trustees, and Howard, alleging a
number of causes of action, including sexual harassment under
Title VII.204 Howard counterclaimed that Longmire abused the
legal process and defamed him.20 5
One of several discovery disputes 2°6 arose in which Long-
mire sought information about Howard's prior sexual conduct,
194. Weiss, 142 F.R.D. at 315 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69).
195. 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987).
196. Weiss, 142 F.R.D. at 316 (citing Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 484).
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565
(8th Cir. 1992);Jones v. Wesco Invs., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154, 1155 n.5 (8th Cir.
1988); Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1495 (E.D. Mo.
1989)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 317.
201. 151 F.R.D. 414 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
202. See id. at 416.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 415-16.
205. See id. at 416.
206. The court described the discovery phase of the case as being,
"marked by hostility, anger and a general inability on the part of counsel to get
along." Id. The court reported that between October 30 and December 18 of
1992, at least nine separate discovery motions were filed by the parties. See id. at
416-17.
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and the defendants sought information about Longmire's prior
sexual conduct.207 In October of 1992, the court entered an
order permitting the defendants to ask Longmire about her sex-
ual conduct only with people that Howard had known about
while she was employed at the University.208 The court's order
also permitted Longmire to ask about Howard's sexual relations
with persons that he supervised during his most recent term as
President of the University.209 Longmire, however, sought to ask
Howard about his sexual conduct while he was employed at
another university prior to serving as President of Alabama State,
and about his sexual conduct while he had been employed at
Alabama State prior to his employment at the other university.210
Howard, likewise, sought to ask Longmire about her prior sexual
relations beyond the limits that the court had set.21 1 Both parties
appealed the court's order.212
Longmire argued that the evidence of Howard's sexual activ-
ities prior to returning to Alabama State to serve as its president
were relevant to demonstrate that the Board of Trustees knew or
should have known about Howard's improper sexual activities
prior to hiring him.213 The court noted, however, that it had
dismissed a previous claim by Longmire in which she asserted
that the Board of Trustees negligently supervised Howard.214
Further, the court noted that under the quid pro quo theory of
sexual harassment, strict liability applies, while under the hostile
environment theory, Longmire could prevail against the Univer-
sity and its trustees only if she could show that they knew or
should have known about Howard's harassment of her and failed
to take "prompt remedial action against Dr. Howard. 21 5 Thus,
the court found that the trustees' knowledge of Howard's sexual
conduct at another university and at Alabama State during a
prior tenure were "absolutely irrelevant" to her Title VII
207. See id. at 417.
208, See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. The court noted that Dr. Howard left Alabama State in 1976





214. See id. at 418.
215. Id. (citing Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316
(l1th Cir. 1989)). The court stated that Longmire, "never specifically
categorized her sexual harassment claim as either a 'quid pro quo' claim or a
'hostile environment' claim." Id.
320 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
claims. 2 16 Additionally, the court found it, "important ... [to]
place limits on the inquiries into sensitive areas such as sexual
activity in order to control the case." 217 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the limitations contained in the October order were,
"consonant with both the letter and the spirit of Rule 26 and
necessary to prevent unnecessary embarrassment and invasions
of Dr. Howard's private life." 218
The court further found, however, that Ms. Longmire had
the same interests as Dr. Howard in, "being free from harass-
ment, embarrassment, and unnecessary invasions into [her] pri-
vate life."1 9 Like the defendant in Priest v. Rotay,220 Howard
argued that inquiries into Longmire's prior sexual behavior
could reveal that she, "engaged in sexual relationships with indi-
viduals in authority over her, resulting in [her] accepting money
or favors from such individuals after they have been placed in a
compromising position." 22' Such evidence, Howard contended,
would be relevant under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 222 to demonstrate that Longmire had a "motive, plan, or
scheme" to put him in a similar situation. 223 The court con-
cluded, however, that, "[t]his sort of generalized allegation that
there might be some 404(b) evidence somewhere in the case is
insufficient to overcome the 'potential of the requested discovery
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The court instructed, however, that if Longmire had, "actual
evidence, not argument, which would establish a good faith basis for the inquiry
about Dr. Howard's sexual activity at places other than Alabama State and some
relevance to that inquiry, [she could] make an ex parte motion under seal
requesting that the court allow such inquiry." Id.
In the end, however, Longmire was able to attain the discovery of the
desired information about Howard's sexual past. Because Howard asserted a
defamation counterclaim, the court found that under Alabama law, he had
placed his character at issue. See id. at 419 (citing Parker v. Newman, 75 So.
479, 485 (Ala. 1917)). Thus, the court concluded that Longmire could ask
Howard about "any incidents where he is alleged to have assaulted other
females or attempted to force them to have sex with him against their wills." Id.
Further, the court stated that if Howard offered evidence of his good character,
Longmire could "ask questions about any extra-marital affair that Dr. Howard
may have had while he was either at Jackson State or Alabama State." Id.
219. Id. at 418.
220. 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
221. Longmire, 151 F.R.D. at 418.
222. Rule 404(b) contains examples of permissible uses of character
evidence that are not proscribed by the rule's general prohibition of character
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). They include, "proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
223. Longmire, 151 F.R.D. at 418.
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to harass, intimidate, and discourage [Longmire] in her efforts
to prosecute her cause."' 224 Rather, the court found that How-
ard's requested discovery, "'would only serve as [a tool] of annoy-
ance and harassment.' 225  The court thus affirmed the
limitations specified in the October order.22
6
In sum, prior to the enactment of the 1994 amendments to
Rule 412, federal courts generally protected the privacy interests
of individuals in sexual harassment discovery disputes that
involved sexual behavior or predisposition evidence. However,
federal courts also recognized that in particular disputes, a
party's need for particularly relevant information could outweigh
his opponent's privacy interests. 227 The courts often found the
224. Id. (quoting Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
225. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Utah
1987)).
226. See id. at 421. As with Longmire's requested discovery, however, the
court specified that, "[i]f the defendants have actual evidence, as opposed to
argument, which would establish a good faith basis for the inquiry about Ms.
Longmire's past sexual activity and some relevance to it, they may make an ex
parte motion under seal requesting that the court allow such inquiry." Id. at
418-19.
227. Of course, one issue that is unresolved by the federal courts is
whether a litigant's constitutional right of privacy is implicated when the courts
compel the litigant to divulge her prior sexual history. See Baer et al., supra note
7 (discussing the tension between a Title VII sexual harassment plaintiffs need
for broad discovery of her harasser's sexual history with his fundamental right
of privacy). Given the protection afforded privacy under Rule 26(c) it is
unlikely that a federal court would ever reach this issue. See, e.g., Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989) ("Because
this court finds that [Rule 26] adequately protect[s] the [blood] donor's
privacy interests in this case, the court need not engage in a constitutional
analysis.").
Notably, however, California state courts have recognized a state
constitutional right of privacy that is implicated in discovery disputes involving
sexual evidence. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987).
In Vinson, Katherine Vinson applied for a job with the Peralta: Community
College District. See id. at 407. She alleged that her interviewer commented on
her attractiveness, her anatomy, and his desire to have sexual relations with her,
and intimated to her that her attaining the position was conditioned on her
acquiescence to his sexual desires. See id. After Vinson was hired by another
department of the Peralta Community College District, her original interviewer
arranged to have her transferred to his department, and fired her soon
thereafter. See id. Vinson sued the Peralta Community College District,
asserting claims for sexual harassment, wrongful discharge, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and alleging damages for continuing mental
ailments. See id. The defendants sought to compel Vinson to undergo a
medical and a psychological exam. See id. at 407-408. Vinson sought a
protective order prohibiting questions during the exam into her sexual history.
See id. at 408. The court found that the federal Constitution protects the right
to sexual privacy in the context of both married and unmarried individuals. See
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evidence irrelevant under Rule 26(b) (1)221 unless it related
directly to an element of the cause of action, such as the
unwelcomeness requirement, 229 or directly to an allegation of
damages.23 0 Moreover, even when courts permitted the discov-
ery, they often limited its scope to evidence that was not, "remote
in time or place to [the party's] working environment."23' Thus,
although the federal discovery scheme operates under a broad
concept of "relevance, 23 2 under Rule 26(c) the federal courts
have recognized that an individual's interest in privacy often out-
weighs a party's need for broad discovery of sexual evidence. 233
C. Cases Analyzing Evidence of a Party's Sexual Conduct or
Predisposition in a Discovery Dispute Subsequent to the
Enactment of Rule 412.
A case that perhaps best illustrates the influence that Rule
412 can have in a discovery proceeding is Burger v. Litton Indus-
id. at 410 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). However, the court found it more significant that
the California Constitution specifically protects the right of privacy as an
inalienable right that encompasses sexual relations. See id. (citing Fults v.
Superior Court, 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Morales v. Superior
Court, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)). While the defendants argued
that Vinson waived her right to privacy by asserting mental and emotional
damages, the court stated that Vinson was not, "compelled, as a condition to
entering the courtroom, to discard entirely her mantle of privacy." Id. The
court found that while Vinson implicitly waived her right to privacy, the waiver
encompassed only discovery that was, "directly relevant to [her] claim .. .and
essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit." Id. at 411 (citing Britt v. Superior
Court, 574 P.2d 766, 775 (Cal. 1978)). Thus, the court concluded that while
she, "waived her right to privacy... by alleging continuing mental ailments...
she has not, merely by initiating this suit for sexual harassment and emotional
distress, implicitly waived her right to privacy in respect to her sexual history
and practices." Id.
228. See Longmire v. Alabama State Univ., 151 F.R.D. 414 (M.D. Ala.
1992); Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
229. See Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992);
Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987); see also supra notes 88-106
and accompanying text (discussing the "unwelcomeness" requirement and its
proof in Title VII suits).
230. See Kennedy v. Fritsch, No. 90 C 5446,1991 WL 277624 at *1-2 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 19, 1991);James v. Miller, No. 86 C 10081, 1988 WL 72290 at *1 (N.D.
Ill. July 1, 1988); Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 485.
231. Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 484.
232. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
233. See Longmire v. Alabama State Univ., 151 F.R.D. 414, 418 (M.D. Ala.
1992); Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 485; Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 761-62 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
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tries, Inc.23 14 In May of 1995,Joffre Burger, the plaintiff in a sexual
harassment action against Litton Industries and against Mr.
Schoen, her supervisor, deposed "Laura, "235 a non-party witness
whose husband had been fired by Schoen.2 3 6 Laura testified
about the sexual activities of her co-workers while working at
another facility owned by Litton, and about being sexually
harassed by Mr. Schoen. 237 The defendants' counsel asked
Laura whether she had had sexual relationships with other Lit-
ton employees during her employment. 238 Burger's attorney
objected, asserting that the question violated Laura's right of pri-
vacy.23 9 Laura refused to answer any questions about her sexual
relationships. 4 °
In May of 1995, the defendants argued at a conference held
before the court that the evidence would impeach Laura,
because she frequently discussed with her co-workers her sexual
relationships. 241  Thus, they contended that the evidence they
sought would put her testimony that the Litton employees, "were
talking about sex all the time ' 24 2 into proper context.24 3 Fur-
ther, they argued that the deposition testimony they sought
would demonstrate that Laura was biased, because Schoen had
fired one of the employees with whom she allegedly had a sexual
relationship. 24 4 The court suggested that "a very strict confiden-
tiality order" would sufficiently protect Laura's privacy interests,
and that she could seek a protective order if she desired.
24 5
Because Laura failed to seek a protective order, the court in July
of 1995 ordered that her deposition be continued, "subject to a
motion by her for reconsideration. '2 46 Burger sought reconsid-
eration, and Laura's attorney in a letter to the court objected to
the questions, asserting that they violated her right to privacy
234. No. 91 CIV. 0918 (WK) (AJP), 1995 WL 476712 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
1995).
235. "Laura" is the fictitious name of the witness, used by the court to
protect her identity. See id. at *1. For convenience, this Note will likewise refer






241. See id. at *2.
242. Id. (quoting from Laura's deposition).
243. See id.
244. See id. at *1.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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under California law.247 The court treated the letter asjoining in
Burger's motion, and granted the motions to reconsider.248
On reconsideration, the court noted that although Rule 412
does not apply "directly" to the discovery process, the court was
obliged to consider it in deciding the discovery dispute to pre-
serve the policy of Rule 412.249 The court further noted that
under Rule 412, Litton and Schoen had the burden to show that,
"'the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under
the facts and theories of the . . . case, and [could not] be
obtained except through discovery.' , 250 The court agreed with
the defendants that, "Laura's discussions about sex with others at
Litton would be relevant (in a discovery sense)" to put her testi-
mony about the sexual nature of the workplace conversation into
context.251 However, the court found that the defendants' coun-
sel had already asked her if she discussed her sexual relationships
at work, and that she answered in the negative.252 Thus, the
court concluded that although questions about her sexual rela-
tionships could lead to discovery about her conversations at work
concerning those relationships, the defendant's "attenuated
claim of need" for this information did not "substantially out-
weigh[ ]" the invasion of Laura's privacy. 25 3 Further, the court
found that because the defendants had already established that
Laura's husband had been fired by Schoen, another inference of
bias, even if it were true, could not "substantially outweigh" the
invasion of her privacy. 254 Hence, the court held that Litton and
247. See id; see also Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987)
(finding a right to sexual privacy that is protected by the California
Constitution during discovery).
248. See Burger, 1995 WL 476712, at *1.
249. See id. at *2 (citing FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note).
250. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note).
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 412(b) (2)).
254. Id. at *3. But see Blackmon v. Buckner, 932 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Ind.
1996). In Blackmon, the court granted the defendants' motion to admit
evidence under Rule 412(c) that Jeffrey Blackmon, a prisoner who sued two
prison officials alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to the
threat that other prisoners would rape him, had had a homosexual relationship
with another prisoner. See id. at 1129. Blackmon's lover had been moved by
Major Norman Buckner, one of the defendants, away from Blackmon. See id.
Blackmon wrote to Buckner requesting that his lover be returned to his
cellblock, and Buckner didn't respond. See id. Less than three weeks later,
Blackmon initiated the suit. See id. The court found that the evidence attacked
Blackmon's credibility, and suggested a motive to file a false claim against
Buckner. See id. Thus, the court concluded that under Rule 412 its probative
value substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to Blackmon. See
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Schoen failed to meet their burden of showing that the evidence
they sought would be, "'relevant under the facts and theories of
the ... case." 255 In so holding, the court not only shifted the
burden from Laura to Litton and Schoen to show good cause for
the protective order, but the court also heightened the standard
for good cause by making Litton and Schoen show that the value
of the evidence would "substantially outweigh" Laura's interest in
privacy.
In Barta v. City of Honolulu,25 6 the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii also applied the balancing test of
Rule 412(b) (2) to a determine a party's eligibility for a protective
order under Rule 26(c). Clarissa Barta, a former employee of
the Honolulu Police Department, sued the City and County of
Honolulu and several of its employees for sexual harassment and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.257 During one depo-
sition, the defendants' counsel asked the deponent if he had ever
had a sexual relationship with Barta. 258 During another deposi-
tion, the defendants' counsel asked Sheila Nitta, Barta's former
roommate, if Barta had ever dated anyone while they lived
together.259 Nitta responded affirmatively, and over the objec-
tions of Barta's counsel, Nitta provided the names of Hawaii
police officers that Barta had dated.260 The defendants' counsel
further asked Nitta to describe two incidents, one in which Barta
had allegedly been found "in a compromising position" with an
officer at an off-duty party, and another in which she had alleg-
edly attempted to seduce an officer outside the workplace.261
Barta sought a protective order to preclude the discovery of
her sexual conduct outside the workplace, arguing that Rule 412
prevented its admissibility despite the broad scope of Rule
26(b) (1).262 She asserted that the defendants' questions were
asked in order to harass and intimidate her.263 The defendants
argued that as a rule of admissibility, Rule 412 was inapplicable
to their discovery dispute.264 Further, they argued that the infor-
255. Burger, 1995 WL 476712, at *2 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory
committee's note).
256. 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996).
257. See id. at 133. Barta's complaint also asserted claims of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, retaliation, and racial and sex discrimination. See
id.
258. See id. at 134.
259. See id. at 134 n.4.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 134 n.5.
262. See id. at 134-35.
263. See id. at 135.
264. See id.
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mation they sought was necessary to show that Barta welcomed
the alleged harassment, and that it was necessary to support their
defenses in regard to "issues of causation, damages, and appor-
tionment. '265 Finally, they argued that because Barta testified
that she was a devout member of the Mormon Church, she had
placed her credibility at issue, and thus evidence of her sexual
practices that contradicted Morman doctrine was necessary to
challenge that testimony.266
The court stated that the purpose of Rule 412 is to "'safe-
guard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential
embarrassment and sexual stereotyping... and the infusion of
sexual innuendo into the factfinding process."' 267 To further
this policy rationale, the court found that it, "must impose cer-
tain restrictions on discovery to preclude inquiry into areas which
will clearly fail to satisfy the balancing test of Rule
412(b) (2) []268 Thus, the court concluded, "Rule 412 ... must
constrict the broad scope of Rule 26(b) (1)."269
The court stated that it was "convinced" that the sexual con-
duct of Barta while at work and with named defendants was rele-
vant, and that the defendants should be given "reasonable leeway
for discovery of evidence pertaining to those areas. "270 However,
the court found that evidence of Barta's sexual conduct with
non-defendants away from the workplace was outside the proper
scope of Rule 26(b) (1).271 The court concluded that her sexual
conduct "remote in time [or] kind from her claims" was irrele-
vant to her claims or to the defendants' defenses, and in particu-
lar to the welcomeness inquiry.272 Further, the court found that
the defendants had neither been "precluded from discovery
of... Barta's sexual experience ... at the time of her marriage,
nor.., deprived of significant discovery concerning her behavior
relevant to other values central to the Mormon faith. ' 27 3 Thus,
the court found that the defendants were not precluded from
265. Id.
266. See id. at 136.
267. Id. at 135 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note).
268. Id.
269. Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court quoted the language in
the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 412 that advocates shifting the burden
of showing good cause to the defendant in Rule 26(c) determinations. See id.
(quoting FED. R. EVD. 412 advisory committee's note).
270. Id. at 135 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69
(1986); Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 502-03 (D.N.M. 1996); Mitchell v.
Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Utah 1987)).
271. See id. at 136.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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discovering evidence that would test Barta's claim for damages or
her credibility.2 74 Therefore, the court concluded that the dis-
covery "would not lead to evidence [that] would meet the balanc-
ing test for admissibility under Rule 412(b) (2). " 275
In Sanchez v. Zabihi,276 the United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico also applied Rule 412 to a discovery
dispute. Injuly of 1995, Winona Sanchez sued her employer and
Mohammad Zabihi, alleging that Zabihi created a sexually hos-
tile work environment by making unwanted sexual advances
towards her.277 She asserted claims for sexual harassment under
Title VII, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for
punitive damages.278 In an interrogatory, the defendants sought
detailed information about any sexual advances she had made to
or received from a co-worker at any job in the previous ten years
and about any relationships she had had with other co-workers
during the same period.279 Sanchez refused to answer the ques-
tions, asserting that the information was inadmissible under Rule
412 and, therefore, not reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence under Rule 26.280 The defendants
sought to compel Sanchez to answer the interrogatory, contend-
ing that Sanchez was the sexual aggressor, and that thus the
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. 166 F.R.D. 500 (D.N.M. 1996).
277. See id. at 500.
278. See id. Sanchez also asserted a claim for intentional interference
with an employment contract. See id.
279. See id. at 501. Specifically, the interrogatory asked:
1. In the last ten (10) years, have you ever:
a. made any personal, romantic, or sexual advances towards any
co-worker, or any person with whom you worked at the time, or any
person who also worked at your same place of employment; or
b. been the subject of personal, romantic, or sexual advances by a
co-worker, or by any person with whom you worked at the time, or
by any person who also worked at your same place of employment;
or
c. had a close personal, romantic, or sexual relationship, however
brief, with any co-worker, or any person with whom you worked at
the time, or any person who also worked at your same place of
employment?
If so, for each item above, please identify the person(s) involved, the relevant
date(s), the relevant place(s) of employment, the number and/or frequency of
any such advance(s), whether such advance(s) were welcome or unwelcome,
whether you or the other person(s) involved ever complained in any way
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information showed that Sanchez could not prove that Zabihi's
behavior was unwelcome.
28 1
The court stated that although the motion to compel was
governed by Rule 26, it was obliged to "remain [ ] mindful of the
policy underlying Rule 412. ''282 Thus, the court found that Rule
412 was applicable, and had "significance in deciding [the
defendants'] discovery motion. ''283 The court held that under
both Rule 26 and Rule 412, "[t]he proper query... is whether
the information sought... is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence in light of the parties' claims
and defenses, while remaining mindful of the policy underlying
Rule 412[.]' ' 284 The court concluded that the interrogatory
should be "narrowly tailored" to permit the defendants some dis-
covery while protecting Sanchez's privacy interests.285 To attain
this result, the court granted the defendants' motion to compel
some of the information, while issuing a protective order sua
sponte precluding the rest.2 8 6 The court limited the scope of the
inquiry to the previous three years, determined that Sanchez did
not need to answer any of the questions in relation to the co-
worker who had become her husband, and ordered that her
answers be given under oath and given only to the defendants'
attorney.287
Like the court in Sanchez, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland in Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins University
281. See id. at 501. The defendants also argued that the evidence
demonstrated that Sanchez had a "habit" of sexually aggressing under Rule 406.
See id. at 502. The court cited Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983) in
denying the motion to compel premised on Rule 406. Sanchez, 166 F.R.D. at
502 (discussing the Rule 406 argument made and rejected in Priest, 98 F.R.D. at
758-59). See also Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Utah 1987)
(rejecting the argument that evidence of plaintiffs sexual behavior was
admissible as "habit" evidence).
282. Sanchez, 166 F.R.D. at 501 (citing Monnin, supra note 9, at 1197-98).
283. Id. at 502 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See id. at 500.
287. See id. at 502. Finding that it was "hindered in making a ruling"
because it had not seen the information that the defendants sought in their
interrogatory, the court "employ[ed] several of the procedural safeguards used
in a Rule 412(c) proceeding in the context of the . . .Rule 26 discovery
motion." Id. Thus, the court prohibited the defendants' attorney from sharing
the information with anyone, including his clients, without a motion, a hearing,
and a court order. See id. at 503. In addition to these limitations, the court also
struck the word "personal" from subsections (a), (b) and (c) of the
interrogatory as vague. See id. See also supra note 279 (text of defendants'
interrogatory).
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Applied Physics Laboratorf8 s permitted discovery of sexual evi-
dence only after granting a protective order that was not sought.
PJ. Herchenroeder sued The Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory ("Laboratory"), her employer, and Phil
Sodergren, her supervisor, for sexual harassment and for defa-
mation.28 9 Among other things, she alleged that Sodergren
often accused her of having sexual relations with Warren Brood,
a business associate. 29 ° During her deposition, the Laboratory's
counsel asked Herchenroeder if she had ever engaged in sexual
activity with Brood.291 After she answered no, the Laboratory's
attorney asked her if she and Brood had ever discussed having
sexual relations.292 Herchenroeder refused to answer this ques-
tion. The Laboratory sought to compel her answer, arguing that
the information was relevant to whether Sodergren believed
Herchenroeder welcomed his conduct, to whether Sodergren's
statements were true or made maliciously, recklessly, or negli-
gently, and to the credibility of Brood, who was an important wit-
ness for Herchenroeder. 293 Herchenroeder asserted that the
information was inadmissible under Rule 412, and thus not
discoverable.294
After quoting the language from the Advisory Committee's
note to Rule 412 that instructs judges to issue protective orders
presumptively under Rule 26(c), the court stated that, "in deter-
mining whether the requested discovery . . . is appropriate, I
must look to both [Rule] 26 and [Rule] 412. ' ' 295 The court
agreed that under all three of the Laboratory's arguments the
discovery was relevant. 296 However, although Herchenroeder
did not seek a protective order,297 the court determined that
given the "highly sensitive" nature of the discovery, "the
requested discovery should [not] be permitted without an appro-
priate protective order/confidentiality agreement as contem-
plated by [Rule] 412. ' '29' Further, the court, pursuant to Rule
288. 171 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1997).






295. Id. at 182 (citing Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500 (D.N.M 1996);
Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996)).
296. See id.
297. While Herchenroeder did not seek a protective order, the court
noted that the Laboratory indicated its willingness to enter into a protective
order. See id.
298. Id.
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26(c) (3),29 ordered that the Laboratory ask its questions
through interrogatories. . While the court left the terms of the
"protective order/confidentiality agreement" to be worked out
by the parties,"' it indicated that it found the protective orders
in Sanchez and Barta to be "instructive.
3 0 2
In contrast to Sanchez and Herchenroeder, the court in Ramirez
v. Nabil's, Inc.313 did not enter an unsought protective order in a
discovery dispute to safeguard the policy of Rule 412. In October
of 1995, Nabil's, Inc., a company that was being sued by three
former employees for sexual harassment, sought to compel one
plaintiff to authorize the release of her medical and psychiatric
records, and to compel another plaintiff to disclose the names
and addresses of her health care providers for the previous five
years. 0 4 Nabil's argued that the discovery could lead to evidence
that would contradict the plaintiffs' claims that they suffered
emotional damages, or that would indicate that factors other
than the alleged harassment caused their emotional distress.30 '
Further, Nabil's contended that the information could lead to
the discovery of admissible sexual propensity evidence of one of
the plaintiffs. 0 6 In response, the plaintiffs asserted that the
information Nabil's sought concerned adolescent problems, and
that Rule 412 was intended to prevent intrusive questioning that
probes into one's adolescent past.307
After quoting the language from the Advisory Committee's
note to Rule 412 that states that, " [c]ourts should presumptively
issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking
discovery"0 8 proves that the evidence is relevant and discovera-
ble, the court stated that the plaintiffs "proffered no adequate
reason for barring the discovery."30 9 The court concluded that
the information Nabil's sought, "appear[ed] reasonably calcu-
299. Rule 26(c) (3) permits ajudge to order that discovery be pursued by
a method different than the method sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(3).
300. See Herchenroeder, 171 F.R.D. at 182. The court stated that if the
Laboratory believed after Herchenroeder answered the interrogatories that
further questioning was appropriate, the court would determine whether she
should be further deposed. See id.
301. Id. at 182-83. The court noted that if the parties were unable to
come to an agreement on the order's terms, the court would establish the
terms. See id at 183.
302. Id. at 183 n.14.
303. Civ.A. No. 94-2396-GTV, 1995 WL 609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
304. See id. at *1.
305. See id. at *2.
306. See id.
307. See id. at *3.
308. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
309. Ramirez, 1995 WL 609415, at *3.
1998] SHIELDING PARTIES TO TITLE VII ACTIONS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 331
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '"310 Thus,
the court placed the burden on the plaintiffs to establish that the
information was not discoverable. This approach contrasts with
the approach taken by the Sanchez311 and Herchenroede 12 courts,
which granted protective orders the opponents of the discovery
did not seek in order to safeguard the policy of Rule 412.a13
In Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co.,3 4 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, like the court in Rami-
rez, did not enter an unsought protective order to safeguard the
plaintiff. However, like the courts in Burger and Barta, the court
applied the balancing test of Rule 412(b) (2) in resolving a dis-
covery dispute. Susan Alberts, an employee of Wickes Lumber
Co., sued Wickes and Jim Crew, an employee of Wickes, for sex-
ual harassment alleging that in 1992 Crew subjected Alberts to
numerous sexual advances.115 One such incident occurred at a
conference in June of 1992, in which Crew allegedly entered
Alberts' hotel room and sexually assaulted her.316 During the
incident, Alberts allegedly told Crew that she had no birth con-
trol in an attempt to persuade him to stop. 317 Alberts contended
that because of the incident, she experienced continuing emo-
tional distress, and had difficulty engaging in sexual intimacy.
318
Later that summer Crew allegedly found condoms in the glove
compartment of Alberts' car.319
During her deposition, Crew's attorney asked Alberts several
questions about her use of contraceptives in 1992,320 about
whether she kept condoms in her car,321 about whether she dis-
310. Id.
311. Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500 (D.N.M. 1996).
312. Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., 171
F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1997).
313. See Herchenroeder, 171 F.R.D. at 182; Sanchez, 166 F.R.D. at 500.
314. No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995).
315. A thorough recitation of the facts of Alberts can be found in Alberts v.
Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1211 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5,
1996) (considering defendants' motion for summary judgment).
316. See id. at *15-17. Crew allegedly entered Alberts' hotel room, pushed
her onto her bed, kissed her, fondled her genitals, exposed his penis and
instructed her to perform fellatio. See id.
317. See Alberts, 1995 WL 117886, at *2 n.1.
318. See id. at *4-5.
319. See id. at *3.
320. Crew's attorney asked Alberts the following questions: "[I]n the year
1992, was it your testimony that you never used any kind of birth control?" Id at
*1. "[I]n the month of June of 92 what form of birth control [were you]
using?" Id. at *3.
321. See id. at *3. Specifically, Crew's attorney asked Alberts, "At any time
did you have any contraceptives in that automobile in the garage?" Id. Further,
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cussed with her expert witness two alleged affairs she had had
with other Wickes' employees, 2 and about the problems she
had allegedly experienced attaining sexual intimacy after the
assault.3 23 Alberts refused to answer the questions, asserting that
under Rule 412 the evidence that Crew sought was inadmissible,
and thus the questions were not calculated to lead to admissible
evidence under Rule 26(b) (1).324 Crew sought to compel
Alberts to answer the questions.3 25
The court announced a two-step analysis to determine if the
information Crew sought was calculated to lead to admissible evi-
dence under Rule 26(b). First, the court stated it would evalu-
ate the relevance of the information. 26 Second, the court
stated it would weigh the probative value of the information
according to Rule 412(b) (2)327 to determine if it substantially
outweighed the danger of harm or of unfair prejudice
to Alberts. 32' Thus, although the court acknowledged the
tremendous difficulty in determining whether the relevance
of the requested discovery "substantially outweighed" the dan-
ger of harm to Alberts,329 the court analyzed each dis-
puted discovery request under the test of Rule 412(b)(2). * °
he asked, "[I]f Crew says he saw contraceptives in there, he is being mistaken, is
that correct? In the month of August 1992, were you using any form of birth
control?" Id.
322. See id. at *4. Specifically, Alberts was asked if she had told her
psychologist that she had had an affair with a manager named Dick Bradford,
and if she had had an affair with another employee named Wade Baldwin. See
id.
323. See id. at *5.
324. See id. at *l.
325. See id.
326. See id. at *2.
327. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2); see also supra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text (discussing the Rule 412(b) (2) balancing test).
328. See Alberts, 1995 WL 117886, at *2.
329. Id. at *I.
330. Regarding the questions concerning Alberts' use of contraceptives
in 1992, -see supra note 320, the court found that if she in fact used
contraceptives in 1992, then she could have been lying about not having
contraceptives on night of the alleged assault. See Alberts, 1995 WL 117886, at
*2. However, if Alberts had in fact made the statement to Crew to dissuade his
sexual attack, then the fact that she was lying strengthened her claim. See id. If
she was not lying, and really had no contraceptives on the night of Crew's
attack, then the court stated that Crew could argue that the only reason she did
not have sex with him was because she had no birth control. See id. The court
noted, however, that Alberts' testimony established on its face that she had no
birth control on the night of the attack. See id. Thus, the court concluded that
Crew could make this argument based on the record. See id. Consequently, the
court concluded that permitting Crew to ask the questions concerning Alberts'
use of birth control to prove that she actually had birth control would be "at
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The court did not, however, explicitly mention the policy ration-
ale of Rule 412.31
Finally, in Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc.,332 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of New York, like the court
in Ramirez, quoted the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 412,
but construed the language narrowly in deciding a discovery dis-
pute. In August of 1995, Michele Holt sued Welch Allyn, her
former employer, for sexual harassment.33 3 Welch Allyn issued a
most, minimally probative of any issue in the case." Id. The court determined
that this minimal probative value would "clearly be outweighed by the
substantial harm and prejudice to ... Alberts." Id.
Regarding the questions about whether Alberts had kept condoms in car,
see supra note 321, the court found that if she had in fact kept condoms in her
car, a jury could infer that she could not have been as traumatized as she
claimed from the assault if just a few weeks after the assault she permitted Crew
into her car, and permitted him to open a glove compartment that contained
condoms. See Alberts, 1995 WL 117886, at *3. The court found that the
probative value of that information would substantially outweigh the harm or
prejudice it might cause Alberts. See id. at *4. The court noted that during the
discovery phase, the determination as to whether this information would
substantially outweigh the danger of harm or prejudice to Alberts was "a very
difficult determination to make." Id. The court stated, however, that because
Alberts alleged emotional distress damages that "last[ed] to the present time,"
the balancing test of Rule 412(b) (2) favored Crew. Id.
Regarding the questions concerning whether Alberts had disclosed to her
expert witness that she had had affairs with other Wickes' employees, see supra
note 322, the court found that during the deposition of Alberts' expert witness,
Crew never asked him if knowledge of these affairs would affect his opinion. See
Alberts, 1995 WL 117886, at * 4. Thus, the court concluded that it could not
determine if this information had "any relevance to the case whatsoever, much
less sufficient probative value as to substantially outweigh the danger of
prejudice and harm to [Alberts]." Id.
Finally, regarding the questions about Alberts' inability to engage in sexual
intimacy, the court found that Rule 412 was inapplicable, because those ques-
tions did not concern her sexual behavior, but her lack of sexual behavior. See
id. at *5. Further, the court found that even if Rule 412 applied to those ques-
tions, because Alberts "injected into the very heart of her damages claim her
inability to engage in intimate sexual relationships," the very high probative
value of the information would substantially outweigh the danger of harm or of
prejudice to Alberts. Id. Indeed, to prohibit Crew from testing Alberts' dam-
ages claim "would be to turn the rape 'shield' law into a sword solely for
[Alberts'] benefit." Id. The danger of harm or prejudice to Alberts, the court
determined, had to be weighed in light of the fact that she herself had "injected
this issue in a very direct and substantial way into the case." Id.
331. See id at *2-5; see also Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l, 163 F.R.D. 617, 619
(D. Utah 1995) (holding that in determining the scope of discovery of
psychological records under Rule 26(b) (1), the rules of evidence, such as Rule
412, may impose limitations on discovery).
332. No. 95-CV-1135 (RSP/GJD), 1997 WL 210420 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15,
1997).
333. See id. at *1.
334 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12
deposition subpoena to obtain from a non-party photographs
that allegedly showed Holt at a party that was attended by a male
exotic dancer, and that were allegedly shown to Welch Allyn
employees at the workplace with Holt's knowledge.3"4 Holt
sought to quash the subpoena, arguing that the photographs
were inadmissible under Rule 412 and "presumptively not discov-
erable."335 The magistrate judge denied the motion to quash the
subpoena, finding the photographs presented evidence relevant
to whether or not the alleged harassment was welcome, and Holt
appealed. 6 The court affirmed the Magistrate's denial, stating
that Holt had confused what was admissible under Rule 412 with
what was discoverable under Rule 26."' Although the court
quoted the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 412, it concluded
that as the photographs were allegedly distributed to Welch Allyn
employees, and as Holt allegedly saw the photographs and did
not appear to be offended, the magistrate judge correctly held
that they were relevant.3
In sum, since the 1994 amendments to Rule 412 have been
enacted, some courts have applied Rule 412 to discovery disputes
that involve sexual behavior or sexual predisposition evidence.
Some courts in issuing protective orders have required the party
seeking to discover sexual behavior or predisposition evidence to
show that the evidence would be relevant under the facts and
theories of the case by proving that the evidence meets the test of
Rule 412(b)(2). 39 Other courts have explicitly narrowed the
scope of discovery in furtherance of the policy rationale behind
Rule 412 by issuing protective orders even when protective
orders were not sought.34 Although some courts have taken a
more traditional approach to these discovery disputes,341 others




338. See id. at *8. According to the court, the standard for reversing a
magistrate judge's order concerning a motion to quash a deposition subpoena
was whether the order was "'clearly erroneous or contrary to law.'" Id. at *7
(quoting Aries Ventures Ltd. v. Axa Fin. S.A., 696 F. Supp. 965, 966 (S.D.N.Y.
1988)).
339. See, e.g., Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw.
1996); Burger v. Litton Indus., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 0918 (WK) (AJP), 1995 WL
476712, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995).
340. See, e.g., Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics
Lab., 171 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1997); Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 502
(D.N.M. 1996).
341. See, e.g., Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc., No. 95-CV-1135 (RSP/GJD), 1995
WL 210420 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997); Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., Civ.A. No. 94-
2396-GTV, 1995 WL 609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
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have recognized that by virtue of the requirement that informa-
tion sought in discovery appear "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence," '342 Rule 412 must inform
whether the discovery is in fact calculated to lead to admissible
evidence.343 Although Rule 26 still governs discovery disputes, as
advocated by the Advisory Committee to Rule 412,"' the policy
rationale of Rule 412 has had a significant impact on Rule 26
determinations involving the discovery of prior sexual behavior
or predisposition evidence.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF RuLE 412 APPLIED TO DISCOVERY
DISPUTES AND A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
As this Note has demonstrated, both prior to and subse-
quent to the 1994 amendments to Rule 412, courts have often
restricted discovery inquiries into sexual behavior or sexual pre-
disposition evidence. Since the 1994 amendments to Rule 412
have been enacted, some courts have made it significantly more
difficult to discover this information, by requiring parties seeking
discovery to show that discovery would pass the test of Rule
412(b) (2). Given the harassing nature of this sort of discovery
and the privacy interests implicated, it is unquestionable that
reform is desirable. However, the Advisory Committee's recom-
mendations and the inconsistent judicial response to those rec-
ommendations inadequately effectuate such reform.
What is needed in this area is a consistent treatment of the
problem. Judicial construction of language buried in a note to
an evidentiary rule does not lend itself to such consistency.
Indeed, while the courts in Burgew4 5 and Barta 46 read the Advi-
sory Committee's recommendations to require that such discov-
ery pass the test of Rule 412(b) (2), other courts, like the courts
in Ramire 47 and Holt,348 quote these recommendations, but give
them no substantive effect. If the privacy interests implicated are
sufficiently important, then the scope of protection granted to
342. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
343. See, e.g., Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL
117886, *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995); Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l, 163 F.R.D.
617, 619 (D. Utah 1995).
344. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
345. Burger v. Litton Indus., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 0918 (WK) (AJP), 1995 WL
476712 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995).
346. Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996).
347. Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., Civ.A. No. 94-2396-GTV, 1995 WL 609415
(D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
348. Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc., No. 95-CV-1135 (RSP/GJD), 1997 WL
210420 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997).
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one's privacy interests in discovery should not depend upon the
forum.
More effective protection could be attained by enacting a
new discovery rule applicable in all courts than through judicial
construction of commentary to an evidentiary rule. Indeed, it is
unclear how much authority an Advisory Committee's note will
have over a court. This is particularly the case when the Advisory
Committee's note interprets a Federal Rule of Evidence, while
purporting to instruct how a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
ought to be interpreted. Amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, by contrast, will achieve the desired consistency, as it
will be applicable to all federal district courts. Moreover, it will
eliminate the anomaly of having an Advisory Committee note
interpreting a rule of admissibility instruct discovery.
One state that has enacted a discovery rule to deal specifi-
cally with the discovery of sexual evidence is California. Califor-
nia's rule states in part:
In any civil action * * * alleging conduct that constitutes
sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery, any
party seeking discovery concerning the plaintiffs sexual
conduct with individuals other than the alleged perpetra-
tor is required to establish specific facts showing good
cause for that discovery, and that the matter sought to be
discovered is relevant to the subject matter of the action
and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence. This showing shall be made by noticed
motion and shall not be made or considered by the court
at an ex parte hearing. This motion shall be accompanied
by a declaration stating facts showing a good faith attempt
at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the
349motion.
349. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017(d) (West Supp. 1997). Jennifer Smith
has used this rule as the basis for a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Her proposed rule states:
1. Requests for Discovery of complainants' sexual conduct in sexual
harassment, sexual assault and sexual battery cases.
(a) In any civil action, alleging conduct that constitutes sexual
harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery, evidence of the
plaintiffs sexual conduct with individuals other than the alleged
perpetrator is not discoverable unless it is to be offered at a hearing
to attack the credibility of the complainant and is admitted in
accordance with subdivision (b) of this section.
(b) A party seeking discovery concerning the plaintiffs sexual
conduct under subdivision (a) of this section is required to
establish specific facts showing good cause for that discovery, and
that the matter sought to be discovered is relevant to the subject
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The weakness of this rule is that it applies only to plaintiffs.
By its terms, it applies neither to non-party witnesses, nor to
defendants. 35 ° Thus, the California rule, like Rule 412 applied to
discovery, is underinclusive, ignoring the privacy interests of
many other individuals. This result is defensible if the only pol-
icy concern underlying the rule is to encourage victims of sexual
misconduct to bring suits vindicating their rights. However, if
protection of privacy is also a goal of the rule, then to be defensi-
ble the rule requires one to make a judgment that the privacy of
plaintiffs is more worthy of protection than the privacy of non-
plaintiffs. One ought not to assume that merely because an indi-
vidual alleges sexual harassment, her privacy interests are wor-
thier of protection than the privacy interests of the individual she
alleges to have perpetrated the harassment.
Perhaps a better discovery rule than the California rule
would be one that is applicable to any discovery of sexual behav-
ior or predisposition evidence, regardless of who is answering the
questions. While under Rule 26(c) any individual from whom
discovery is sought can move to limit the discovery by mandating
that the discovery remain confidential,35 1 not every individual
will seek such a protective order. Evidence of one's sexual behav-
ior or predisposition, however, is of such an intimate nature that
one should not have to seek a court order to keep such informa-
tion confidential. A better rule, therefore, would be one that
would presumptively insure the confidentiality of any discovery
of sexual behavior or predisposition evidence. Rather than
matter of the action and reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. That showing shall be made by
noticed motion and shall not be made or considered by the court
at an ex parte hearing.
Smith, supra note 88, at 108 app. The principal difference between Smith's
proposed rule and the California rule is that Smith's proposed rule begins with
a presumption of non-discoverability, which she derives from California's dis-
covery rule for sexual conduct in administrative proceedings. See id. at 106
n.199 and accompanying text (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11507.6 (West
1995)). The author's criticism of the California rule which follows also applies
to Smith's proposed rule.
350. Recall, however, that California courts liberally construe their
constitutional right of privacy to protect against intrusive discovery of sexual
evidence. See supra note 227 (discussing Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404
(Cal. 1987)); Boler v. Solano County Superior Court, 247 Cal. Rptr 185, 187
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that a discovery order compelling an individual
sexual harassment defendant to answer questions concerning his prior "sexual
relations, intimacies, flirtations, and socializing... with any employees" violated
his right of privacy).
351. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(c) (2) (a court may limit the discovery "on
specified terms and conditions.").
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requiring the individual from whom discovery is sought to show
good cause why the discovery should be confidential, the party
seeking discovery should have to show good cause why the infor-
mation should not remain confidential.
While a discovery rule that grants sexual behavior or predis-
position evidence presumptive confidentiality would protect the
privacy interests of any individual from whom such discovery is
sought, it would also further the policy of encouraging victims to
bring suits. Although potential plaintiffs would still face intrusive
questioning regarding their sexual histories, they would at least
have peace of mind in knowing that their sexual histories would
not become known to readers of the local newspaper. Other
measures under such a rule could also be implemented that
would advance this goal. For instance, the rule could mandate
that any party seeking discovery of sexual behavior or predisposi-
tion evidence provide the individual who is to answer such ques-
tions with written notice of the intent to ask the questions and a
general description of the questions to be asked. The rule could
further require that the party seeking the discovery articulate in
the written notice a theory of relevance that would meet the stan-
dard of Rule 26(b) (1). This provision would serve several pur-
poses. First, it would insure that the target of the intrusive
questions would not be "caught off-guard." Second, by forcing
the party seeking the discovery to articulate a theory of relevance
up front, it would perhaps prevent the party from pursuing
inquiries supported by more tenuous theories of relevance.
Third, it would permit the individual to seek a protective order
prior to the discovery if the articulated theory of relevance is
weak or if the proposed inquiry is overly broad. Not only would
this provision further the policy of encouraging victims of sexual
misconduct to bring suits, it would eliminate surprise, and
encourage the parties prior to discovery to agree upon the scope
of such discovery.
The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure could propose the following rule that would achieve
these results:
Confidentiality of sexual evidence; required notice. Any party
who seeks in discovery information that would meet the
definition of sexual behavior or predisposition evidence
under Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence shall give
the individual from whom the discovery is sought at least
seven days written notice describing the general nature of
the questions, and articulating the relevance of the discov-
ery under Rule 26(b) (1). Any information given in discov-
ery under this rule shall not be disclosed by the party
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seeking the discovery to anyone unless that party by
motion to the court in which the action is pending, or in
the case of a deposition, to the court in the district where
the deposition was taken, shows that the party's need to
disclose the information outweighs the harm that such dis-
closure would cause to the privacy interests of the individ-
ual from whom the discovery was obtained.
Under this proposed rule, an individual from whom discov-
ery is sought could still seek a protective order under Rule 26(c)
to limit the discovery if it is over broad. Under Rule 26(c), of
course, she would need to establish good cause by showing that
her opponent's need for the information does not outweigh its
potential to annoy, to embarrass or to oppress her.3 5 2
While courts should continue to develop the substantive
meaning of the terms "good cause" and "relevance," they should
not follow the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 412 and
require the proponent of discovery to show that the discovery is
relevant under all the facts and theories of the case. In particu-
lar, courts should not follow the approach of Burger35 3 and
Barta 3 5 4 by placing the burden on the party seeking discovery to
show that the discovery would meet the requirements of Rule
412(b)(2). If the reason that discoverability under Rule
26(b)(1) is broader than admissibility is to permit parties to
determine facts that are essential to litigate their cases and to
formulate legal theories, 5 5 then requiring a party to show at this
stage of the litigation that the information "would be relevant
under the facts and theories of the particular case "356 is contrary
to the policy underlying the scope of Rule 26(b) (1). In other
words, it is precisely because a party lacks crucial facts that the
party at the discovery phase of a case often cannot show that the
discovery is relevant under all the facts and theories of the case.
Thus, the party needs leeway to seek information that would not
be admissible at trial.
This is especially so if a court requires a party seeking discov-
ery to meet the standard of Rule 412(b) (2). If it is difficult for a
party in discovery who does not know all the facts of the case to
show that information is relevant under the facts and theories of
the case, it is by implication even more difficult to show that the
352. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
353. Burger v. Litton Indus., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 0918 (WK) (AJP), 1995 WL
476712 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995).
354. Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996).
355. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
356. FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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probative value of the information "substantially outweighs" the
harm to the person giving the information. Indeed, the Alberts5 7
court in applying Rule 412(b) (2) to discovery expressed frustra-
tion in that:
However difficult this balancing of interests [under Rule
412(b)(2)] may be at the time of trial, it is substantially
more difficult when made at the time of discovery and
before the facts, issues, and positions of the parties have
crystallized and before a majority of the evidence sur-
rounding the alleged incident is in the possession of the
parties, much less before the court." 8
By contrast, it seems significantly easier for a party to show
under Rule 26(c) that the tendency of information to annoy, to
embarrass, to oppress, or to cause her undue burden or expense
is greater than her opponent's need for the information. By
applying this standard to Rule 26(c) motions involving sexual
behavior or predisposition evidence, as courts applied before the
1994 amendments to Rule 412, courts will shield the individuals
seeking the protective orders from discovery requests that are
merely intended to harass. However, parties will also be permit-
ted under this standard the flexibility to discover information
that, although embarrassing, is truly relevant. Moreover, if the
discovery is subject to the presumptive confidentiality and notice
provisions of the proposed rule, the embarrassing nature of the
discovery will be further mitigated.
The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, in assessing the proposed rule, should consider the
problems inherent in requiring a proponent of discovery to show
that the discovery would be relevant under all facts and theories
of the case. Particularly, the Advisory Committee should con-
sider the response of some courts to this language in the note to
Rule 412, and the problems inherent in requiring a proponent
of discovery to show that the discovery would meet the test of
Rule 412(b) (2). After considering these problems, in adopting
the proposed rule, the Advisory Committee should draft a note
addressing these problems and instructing courts not to analyze
discovery requests under Rule 412(b) (2), or to require propo-
nents of discovery to show that their requests are relevant under
all the facts and theories of the cases.
The proposed rule, in tandem with the explanatory note,
would achieve the consistency that is lacking under the current
357. Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL 117886
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995).
358. Id. at *1.
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scheme of applying Rule 412 to discovery. The proposed rule
would also further sexual privacy interests, correcting the under-
inclusiveness of the current scheme, and encouraging victims of
sexual misconduct to vindicate their injuries in court. Further-
more, the proposed scheme would preserve the flexibility of par-
ties to discover sexual evidence that is truly relevant, resolving
the overinclusive problem of the current scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress, in enacting the 1994 amendments to Rule 412,
made it significantly more difficult for a party to a trial for sexual
harassment to enter evidence of another's prior sexual behavior
or predisposition. 59 In extending Rule 412 protection to civil
cases, Congress determined that in the civil context, individuals
who have been sexually victimized ought to receive the protec-
tions that victims of sexual misconduct receive in the criminal
context.3 6 ° Congress thus extended two important policy consid-
erations to the civil context: victims of sexual misconduct ought
to be protected from judicial invasions of their privacy, and vic-
tims of sexual misconduct ought to be encouraged to use the
judicial process to attain justice from those who have sexually vic-
timized them. 6 '
Within the context of discovery, to assure that these impor-
tant policies are not undermined, the Advisory Committee to
Rule 412 has advocated that courts "should enter appropriate
orders pursuant to [Rule 26(c)]."362 Specifically, the Advisory
Committee has instructed that courts should "presumptively
issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking
discovery makes a showing that the evidence . . .would be rele-
vant under the facts and theories of the particular case, and can-
not be obtained except through discovery. '3 63  Courts have
consciously restricted the discovery of sexual behavior or predis-
position evidence in light of this language. 64 Some courts have
even read this language to require that the parties seeking such
discovery show that the value of the discovery substantially out-
359. See supra Part II.B (discussing changes made by the 1994 version of
Rule 412).
360. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note ("The need to
protect alleged victims... doles] not disappear because the context has shifted
from a criminal prosecution to a claim for damages or injunctive relief.").
361. See supra notes 45-47, 52 and accompanying text.
362. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
363. Id.
364. See supra Part III.C (discussing cases construing Rule 412 in the
context of discovery).
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weighs the harm that such discovery might cause to the privacy
interests of the individuals from whom the discovery is sought.365
While the policies that underlie Rule 412 are important,
there are other important policy considerations that are unique
to discovery. The scope of discovery, under Rule 26(b) (1), is
broad so that parties may have sufficient information to litigate
their cases, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement.- 6
Under Rule 26(c), however, courts can limit the scope of discov-
ery when it is necessary to protect the privacy interests of parties
from being abused. By advocating that courts presumptively
issue protective orders under Rule 26(c) that preclude discovery
unless a party seeking discovery shows that the discovery is rele-
vant under all facts and theories of the case, the Advisory Com-
mittee has raised the standard of relevance in discovery. This
shift inhibits the policy that favors broad discovery.
While there is a need to prevent sexual harassment litigants
from harassing their opponents through the discovery process,
applying Rule 412 to discovery is inadequate for two reasons.
First, it is underinclusive in that it does not protect the privacy of
individuals who are not alleged victims of sexual misconduct.
Second, it is overinclusive by substantially raising the standard of
discoverability, thereby precluding discovery that is potentially
crucial to a case. The discovery cases involving sexual behavior
or predisposition evidence that arose prior to the enactment of
the 1994 amendments to Rule 412, however, illustrate that courts
recognized and protected the privacy interests of parties from
abuse through Rule 26(c). 3 67 By amending the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to mandate that sexual evidence be granted pre-
sumptive confidentiality and by applying the traditional Rule
26(c) standard to cases in which discovery of sexual evidence is
used to harass, courts will preserve the sexual privacy of all indi-
viduals from whom this sort of discovery is sought, while provid-
ing parties maximum flexibility to discover essential information.
In short, desired reform that does not suffer from the underin-
clusive and overinclusive nature of applying Rule 412 to discov-
ery would be achieved and would be applied consistently, and
the policy interests underlying both Rule 412 and Rule 26 would
be preserved.
365. See supra Part III.C (discussing cases construing Rule 412 in the
context of discovery).
366. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Part III.B (discussing Rule 26 determinations involving
sexual behavior or predisposition prior to the enactment of Rule 412).
